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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research question 
The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and examine the implications for 
Pakistan of clauses 31, 32 and 33 of the Doha Declaration (Box 1), which pertain to the 
relationship between trade and the environment. It is predicated on the very practical 
understanding that given the commitments Pakistan has made—not only in Doha, but 
also in signing various WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)— the 
country needs to maximize the advantages and minimize the adverse consequences of 
these commitments. The Doha Declaration is, in fact, perfectly suited to this end, as the 
three clauses represent both the challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. The intent of 
this thesis is to understand in greater detail what the challenges posed by the first two 
clauses are, and how they can be mitigated, and what the nature of the opportunity 
presented in the third clause is, and how it can be capitalized upon. 
However, there is a larger context for the thesis. It includes: 
a. the reality of the growing importance of environmental issues in the international 
trade regime, both in the form of trade disputes and subjects of discussion in 
policy circles; 
b. the evolving definition of sustainable development1—which includes not only the 
environment but also other key policy goals, namely poverty eradication and 
human development—as an integrated policy objective of Southern countries, and 
its relationship between international trade and;  
c. the long-running engagement between the North and the South over the 
dimensions and scope of globalization;  
d. the multiplicity of global institutions, organizations, and regimes that have 
emerged to govern the process of globalization; and  
e. the rise of knowledge-based production as an integral and defining feature of 
globalization, and its implications both for the North-South divisions and the 
tripartite tension between global regimes on trade, environment, and development. 
Approach of Thesis 
The approach of the thesis merits clarification since this is not intended only to be 
an academic thesis. On the one hand, the research is broad-based, aimed at providing a 
guidance document to facilitate government, private sector and civil society to formulate 
their policies. This is worth emphasizing: the study is a guidance document; it is not 
intended to present policy prescriptions or actions. On the other hand, the paper is also 
focused in at least three ways; it is intended to be: 
                                          
1  The now-standard definition of Sustainable Development was coined by the WCED, popularly known as the 
Brundtland Commission, as “development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs.” 
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• contextual: uses specific cases to unpack the broader conceptual and policy 
issues, thus indicating the direct impacts of policy and drawing lessons for 
future decisions; 
• pragmatic: based on the understanding that Pakistan has entered in certain 
commitments which it must fulfill and is bound by particular global trends 
which it must follow; 
• solution-oriented: recognizing that within global constraints there is adequate 
room for Pakistan to define the terms of its own engagements in a way which 
meet its domestic policy goals as a Southern country, particularly for poverty 
eradication. 
Chapters 2 to 4 of the thesis analyze Clauses 31, 32 and 33 of the Doha 
Declaration respectively, clarifying their implications for Pakistan on the basis of recent 
experience. This is supported by a case study on “Environment Impact and Mitigation 
costs of Cloth and Leather exports from Pakistan”. Chapter 5 builds upon this analysis 
to present broad guidance on an optimal policy stance for engaging in the post-Doha 
world.  
 
The main argument of this thesis is that the winning long-term strategy for 
Southern governments lies in an investment in systems that will enable their producers to 
break into the high-information segments of the market and compete with high-end 
producers. 
 
To this end, sustainable development and the knowledge economy are presented 
as bridges between the policy communities of trade and environment, and as suitable 
concepts that can help Pakistan achieve its own policy goals. The principal 
recommendation is that Pakistan should take a pro-active stand in placing Sustainable 
Development (SD) at the center of trade policy and trade discourse. This is supported by 
three other broad-based recommendations: 
• To develop a base and a process for on-going impact assessment of trade 
liberalization;  
• To develop dynamic SD-centered positions in future negotiations; and  
• To build capacity to adapt to changing situations. 
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1.2 Backdrop to Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
In the past, most developing countries opposed the inclusion of environmental 
issues in trade negotiations on the grounds that these could form the basis of a new 
protectionism by the North. In particular, while many countries have ratified a number of 
MEAs, they did not feel comfortable in allowing the MEAs to provide a lever for such 
protectionism. Yet, environmental issues have emerged in other forms, including such 
noted cases as the shrimp-turtle and the tuna-dolphin disputes, as well as through such 
mechanisms as TRIPS, eco-labeling, and GATS. The Doha agreement brings these issues 
into clear focus, and challenges developing countries to ensure that their engagement 
furthers their long-term policy goals, particularly for poverty eradication in the post-Doha 
world, when environmental issues are increasingly being mainstreamed in the trade 
agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO Fourth Ministerial Declaration at Doha, Qatar, November 2002 
Box 1 – Trade and Environment in the Doha Declaration 
31.  With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, we agree to 
negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on: 
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in 
scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in 
question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not 
a party to the MEA in question; 
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant 
WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status; 
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services. 
We note that fisheries subsidies form part of the negotiations provided for in paragraph 28. 
32.  We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all items on its 
agenda within its current TOR, to give particular attention to: 
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least-developed among them, and those situations 
in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit 
trade, the environment and development; 
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights;  and 
(iii) labeling requirements for environmental purposes. 
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO 
rules. The Committee shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, and 
make recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the 
desirability of negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carried out 
under paragraph 31(i) and (ii) shall be compatible with the open and non-discriminatory 
nature of the multilateral trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations of Members under existing WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and 
obligations, and will take into account the needs of developing and least-developed countries. 
33. We recognize the importance of technical assistance and capacity building in the field of 
trade and environment to developing countries, in particular the least-developed among 
them. We also encourage that expertise and experience be shared with Members wishing to 
perform environmental reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepared on these 
activities for the Fifth Session. 
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Simultaneously, the agreement draws attention to the very policy goals of 
Southern countries—often summarized by such terms as sustainable development or 
human development. The traditional approach of Southern countries is to focus on a 
single goal of the negotiations: market access. The philosophy is that market access 
determines exports, exports determine economic growth, and economic growth 
determines other important policy goals. In this approach, natural resources play a 
secondary role, mainly as raw materials for supporting the growth process. Thus, any 
policy or agreement that places limits on the rights of developing countries to use these 
resources is viewed as potentially harmful to the growth process.  
However, if the overall policy goal is defined more broadly to include not only 
environmental conservation, but also poverty eradication, basic human needs (health, 
education, and civic services), and social equity, the direct relationship assumed to exist 
between various goals and instruments becomes weaker or even disappears. This raises a 
number of key questions on the appropriate policy stance with regard to international 
trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the MEAs are far closer to the spirit of the Southern position on 
Globalization, not only in the emphasis they place on normative goals and the ethical and 
moral obligations of nation-states, but also that they are rooted in the key principle of 
national sovereignty. In this regard, there is a deep-seated opposition between the 
international trade regime established under the WTO, and the international 
environmental regimes established through the MEAs. The WTO regime is a classic 
example of what might be called a global regime: a system that places limits on national 
sovereignty, and is intended to be implemented through a global institution. In contrast, 
Box 2 – The North-South Debate on SD: History in Perspective 
The international legal regime that forms the backdrop to multilateral agreements on 
environment (MEAs) and development is interesting for two reasons: a) it points to the gradual 
convergence of international law in environment and development towards sustainable development; 
and b) it brings out, in sharp contrast, the South-friendly nature of many MEAs and hence the reason 
for their opposition by many Northern countries. In practical terms, this backdrop anticipates the 
development of a single, umbrella international treaty on sustainable development. 
The story begins with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. For the first 
time ever, human rights were brought into the international legal arena, subject to international 
debate and systems of dispensing justice. The Declaration was not legally binding, but formed the 
basis for the legally binding UN Covenants on Human Rights, 1966, and set a precedent for “soft” law 
to be mainstreamed internationally. 
This was followed by an equally visionary Resolution on the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, 1960 (popularly known as the 
Decolonization Resolution). The resolution, for the first time, declared that colonization was against 
the fundamental principles of human rights and against the interests of peace, and also held that “all 
peoples have the right to self-determination”. Importantly, the Decolonization Resolution opened the 
door for the first international environmental treaty, the Treaty on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Wealth, 1962, which established the principle of permanent sovereign rights of nation-
states over their biological resources. Ironically, these gains, fought for so diligently by the South, are 
in danger of being reversed under some elements of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights. This is precisely why the charge of “colonialism” has been placed by some 
critics on the WTO era. 
In 1972, developing countries sought to strengthen earlier global gains at the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment. The resultant Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 
1972 reflects this dedication, and Article 21 specifically echoes the Treaty on Permanent Sovereignty, 
1962 in ensuring the rights of states to “exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies.” At the same time, Stockholm was the first instance where environment and 
development were united, in Principle 8 of the Preamble. Stockholm was also a watershed in 
highlighting the importance of equity in international law: the Declaration stressed the obligations of 
“industrialized” countries to make efforts to reduc  the economic gap between themselves and the 
developing countries, through technology transfer, financial and technical assistance, and fair pricing. 
The spirit of these declar ions persisted in the global neg tiations through the subsequent 
decades. For example, the negotiations leading up to the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 1992 were based on the principles that environment and development are inter-
r lated; i ter and intra-g nerational equity are both important; poverty alleviation is fundamental to 
sustainable development; developing countries need special treatment; and fair trade is essential. 
However, none of these are legally binding instruments, and the rhetorical gains made by the South 
are not translated into practice. On the one hand, the North has not lived up to the commitments 
implied by these agreements; and on the other hand, the South has not made sufficient number of 
pro-active moves towards achieving or even defining its own framework for sustainable development.  
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the MEAs represent by and large what might be called an international ethical regime; 
most of the agreements pertain to broad principles, which are meant to be pursued 
through the national policies of sovereign states. 
This is a major reason for the overt opposition between the trading and 
environmental regimes. It percolates through a variety of institutional and individual 
systems that separate the two regimes. However, the concerns of the South with regard to 
a closer relationship between the two regimes cannot be understood without recognizing 
a basic and inescapable congruence between them. As Konrad von Moltke (2001) has 
reminded us, “The need to manage and protect the environment is itself a powerful force 
promoting ‘globalization’…. This has given rise to the paradoxical situation where some 
of the most vocal opponents of economic globalization are passionate advocates of a 
process of globalization of economic management” (p. 4). In other words, the concern is 
that the South’s irreducible position on national sovereignty would somehow get 
compromised if the globalization of environmental management took the form through 
which economic globalization has been institutionalized in the WTO. 
But this raises a basic conundrum. The main justification for a sovereignty-based 
environmental regime is the willingness and ability of nation-states to pursue the 
objectives to which they express allegiance in international agreements. In the absence of 
an overt and visible commitment to sustainable development by Southern governments, 
the pressures will continue to mount for the globalization of the environmental regime as 
well. This could turn out to be far more inimical to Southern interests than the proposed 
linkage between the WTO and MEAs.  
There is another and perhaps even more significant source of concern. This is that 
the process of globalization has dramatically reshaped the global system of production, 
distribution, investment, and growth. Production is organized around global commodity 
chains; these chains encompass a geographical dispersion of production, multiple patterns 
of industrial structure and technological management, and a global system of governance. 
Value added, profitability, and growth potential is determined not so much by the natural 
resource content as it is by the “knowledge and information” content of the product. This 
content includes the reliable information on product and process, in which consumers are 
interested; and this in turn depends on such things as robust and reliable institutions for 
certification, labeling, disclosure, and standardization. Finally, R&D institutions as well 
as advertising and communication capacities are essential for the enhancement of the 
information content.  
Several authors have pointed out that the single most significant source of wealth 
in the modern economy is no longer the control of natural resources—although natural 
resources remain important—but rather the access to and control of information and 
knowledge; we are living in a knowledge-based economy. Yet, the developmental agenda 
of most Southern governments has not engaged meaningfully with this transformation. In 
particular, if this transformation were taken seriously, the focus of the development 
program would shift from supporting and subsidizing access to natural resources towards 
enabling domestic producers to have preferential access to knowledge and information. 
Such a strategy would, on the one hand, draw attention towards knowledge-producing 
institutions—the higher education system, research and development activities, and 
institutions that enable producers to remain abreast of and influence consumer needs, 
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technological developments, and policy formulation; and on the other hand, lead to the 
reformulation of a robust and meaningful capacity building agenda.  
This provides the backdrop of the approach taken by this paper. This approach 
takes as its starting point the existing policy stance towards the development agenda, and 
consequently towards the agenda on trade and the environment. As such, it does not 
question the centrality of economic growth or market access in the current disposition. 
Instead, it goes beyond the current situation by asking how the world has changed in 
recent years—especially because of Doha development agenda, but more generally 
because of the far-reaching impact of globalization—and how the country can best 
position itself to take advantage of emerging opportunities and minimize the chances of 
adverse impacts. These two trends help keep track of the very different dynamics of the 
global trade and environmental agendas. Whereas the first is in the realm of instrumental 
politics, in which each country has to determine how best to advance its national interests, 
the second is still in the realm of ethical politics, in which the important step is to 
maintain a visible and credible commitment to agreed collective goals.  
Very concretely, I would argue that a slight shift in stance is needed in both these 
areas. First, in area of the trade agenda proper, there needs to be an explicit recognition of 
the fundamental changes that are taking place in the global economy, and consequently of 
the changes that need to be introduced in the underlying development agenda; in 
particular, the developmental interests of the country have to be protected on the basis of 
access to knowledge-based resources—which enable producers and exporters to compete 
effectively in the dynamic segments of the global economy—and not exclusively on 
ensuring access to natural resources. This shift in orientation brings out a number of areas 
in which a sophisticated strategy would enable the country to benefit even from the 
current disputes over trade and the environment.  
Second, in the area of the environmental agenda, the country has to make sure that 
the environmental agenda helps rather than hurts the developmental and equity goals. 
This requires an overt commitment to the ethical agenda that underlies multilateral 
environmental agreements. We have labeled a commitment to this ethical agenda under 
the rubric of sustainable development. A credible commitment to sustainable 
development enables a country to ensure that its development agenda is not jeopardized 
by an externally imposed definition of environmental conservation or social equity. 
Furthermore, it enables the ethical stance on environmental conservation to be integrated 
with an equally important ethical stance on poverty eradication and social development. 
Both of these shifts need to be supported by a proactive and substantially 
redefined agenda for capacity development. Hitherto, mainly donor countries and 
institutions have driven this agenda. However, given the role that capacity building can 
play in enhancing access to knowledge-based resources and thus in stimulating the 
development process, it is important that Pakistan develop a coherent and integrated 
strategy for capacity development. Besides the development and deepening of the 
national capacity for policy formulation and negotiations, there is also a need to invest in 
research and analyses of the impacts of various proposed measures, not only on market 
access, assessed in very static terms, but also on global competitiveness, vulnerability, 
and property rights. This means a continuous and sustained program of impact 
assessment research. 
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The bottom line is that the Doha Declaration comes at an opportune moment for 
Pakistan; it provides an opportunity not only to explore the various response options to 
the concrete agreements made at that forum, but also to reassess the long-term 
developmental agenda in the light of the two dimensions of globalizations that figure in 
Clauses 31-33 of the Declaration, namely trade and the environment.  
 
1.3 The International Trade Regime 
Background: The World Trade Organization 
The WTO came into existence as a single institution on January 1, 1995, upon the 
conclusion of the Eighth Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The WTO is made up a set of Agreements, all of which 
apply to all members in a “package deal”. Its main functions are to oversee 
implementation and administration of Agreements to provide a forum for negotiation and 
to provide a dispute settlement mechanism. 
The governing body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, composed of 
international trade ministers from all member countries, while the General Council is the 
executive body. It has a number of committees, including the Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE) and the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), and councils, 
which work under the General Council on specific areas. A Dispute Settlement Body, 
composed of all members, oversees the implementation and effectiveness of dispute 
settlement; typically, each dispute is heard by a distinctly constituted panel, while a 
permanent Appellate Body acts as the final arbiter.  
The principle behind the WTO is the establishment of a rules and negotiations-
based global trading system that can discourage unilateral trade restrictions and thus 
enhance global trade. The 1994 Marrakech Agreement describes WTO’s goals as: raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment, ensuring large and steadily growing real 
incomes and demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services. 
The Agreement however, qualifies that these objectives are to be achieved while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development and while seeking to protect and preserve the environment. 
The establishment of the rules based system rests upon two main principle: the 
principle of national treatment, which requires that goods and services of other countries 
be accorded the same treatment as goods and services of your own country; and the 
principle of most-favored nation, which requires that if special treatment is given to the 
goods and services of one country, the same treatment must be given to the goods and 
services of all countries. 
Most developing countries are completely in accord with the principles and stated 
goals of the WTO. Indeed, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, which does not 
require positive consensus of all parties to pass a dispute decision but rather a reverse 
consensus of all parties to reject the dispute decision, actually favors the politically 
weaker nations that cannot mobilize support to lobby against a decision. The concerns of 
many Southern countries lie in two dimensions: implementation of the principles and 
opening up of trade barriers to developing country exports (many of which have a 
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competitive edge due to low labor and other costs), and the existence of loopholes that 
allow the North to dictate terms and conditions to the South by leveraging other 
incentives, such as development aid. The latter includes the provision that the WTO 
cannot force a country to change its internal laws to comply with a decision, although it 
can allow retaliatory sanctions or compensation for more trade in other areas. However, 
since Southern nations in reality do not have the political or economic “muscle” to 
impose retaliatory sanctions, their economies are generally much more vulnerable to the 
sanctions in the first place, and they have few alternative trading options to take 
advantage of other concessions. 
Another key concern of Southern countries is the actual negotiations process, so 
essential to the formulation and implementation of Agreements. The reality of 
negotiations has belied the myth in a number of cases, as many Southern countries simply 
do not have the physical or financial capacity to engage comprehensively in the 
negotiations process, particularly in the all-important part away from the table. Also, the 
negotiations have to-date been dominated by opaque procedures involving pre-discussed 
positions among OECD countries, through procedures such as the informal “Green 
Rooms” where closed-door and exclusive talks are held. 
The WTO purports to provide a globally conducive environment for all countries 
to benefit from trade liberalization. While discouraging unilateral actions that would 
harm the weaker in a political tussle with the stronger, the WTO clearly intended to 
establish trade liberalization with rules, or ordered trade. The idea is that the benefits 
from any restrictions in trade, no matter how significant in the short run, have to be 
weighed against the potential long-term costs of such interventions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3 – Facts of Life 
• World trade exceeded US$ 6 trillion in 2000, growing by a factor of 14 over the past 50 
years, but 70% of the benefits of more trade have gone to the North. 
• Least-Developed Countries, with over 10% of the world’s population, have a 0.3% share in 
world trade, down from 50 years ago. 
• In 1950, the ratio of income of the richest fifth of the world’s population to that of the 
poorest fifth was 1:30; by 1989, it was 1:60, and in 2000, it was 1:80. 
• Trans-National Corporations, headquartered in the North, control over 70% of world trade 
and 80% of global foreign investment. 
• While the average world income exceeds US$ 5,000 per year, over 1.3 billion people across 
the world live on under US$ 1 per day (Haq’s Champagne Glass, below). 
• The world’s three richest people have a combined income greater than the GDP of 48 of the 
least developed nations put together. 
• Global carbon dioxide emissions have quadrupled in the past 50 years, although developing 
countries, such as Pakistan, remain considerably below the average emissions per capita. 
• One quarter of the world’s fish stocks are depleted, while a quarter of the world’s known 
mammal species are dangerously close to being extinct. 
• By 2030, with present trends, two-thirds of the world’s population will live with “water 
stress”, at less than 1,000 liters of water per year. 
• Although global de-forestation has slowed down, most developing countries continue to 
exploit their forest resources unsustainably; Pakistan has the world’s second-highest 
deforestation rate. 
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Mahbub-ul-Haq’s Champagne Glass of Inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The philosophy underlying the WTO is that an ordered trade system not only 
leads to increased world trade but also creates benefits shared by all trading partners. This 
forms the basis the present phase of globalization through import liberalization and 
enhanced export earnings, which lead to lower prices and increased efficiency in 
domestic economies, benefiting both consumers and producers. An implicit assumption is 
that these benefits will lead to economic growth and services for human development. 
However, the theory as well as the practice is increasingly being challenged by 
evidence from developing countries. The principal argument is that international trade is 
not an end in itself, but rather a means to broader social goals: economic growth, poverty 
eradication, and social development, and environmental conservation— in short, 
sustainable development. In fact, over the second half of the twentieth century, 
international trade expanded more than 14-fold, and global incomes over five-fold, the 
level of inequality in global incomes increased by an unprecedented amount (Box 3). For 
countries such as Pakistan, trade liberalization would be justified only if it meant more 
equity, less poverty and better conservation of shrinking natural resources. 
 
1.4 The International Environment Regime 
The institution of the WTO, following from multilateral trade negotiations, 
paralleled an initially un-related phenomenon, the emergence of a regime of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), many of which contain explicit trade provisions or 
implicit implications for international trade (see Box 9, Chapter 2). The MEAs regime, 
although not dealing specifically with international trade, contains an implicit leaning and 
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policy interventions, including trade restrictions. In particular, it takes as natural not a 
regime of free trade, but a regime of regulated trade, and seeks to promote good trade, 
that prevents harm to, or actively protects, the natural resource base. The acceptance of 
the need for an MEA regime stems from the same roots as the need for an international 
trade regime: to develop a binding set of rules that can deter harmful unilateral actions. 
Details on the tension between the trade and environmental regimes are provided in 
Chapter 2. However, this is a useful point to summarize the major developments that 
have led to the Doha Agreement. 
There are over 200 multilateral environmental agreements most of which do not 
contain any provisions to curtail or promote international trade specifically. Importantly, 
each MEA has its own set of signatory parties, some of which overlap although a number 
of which do not. About twenty or so Agreements do contain some reference to 
international trade, seven of which are of key importance and have been ratified by 
Pakistan (details in Box 4).  
The implementation of MEAs is complex and varies from country to country and 
agreement to agreement. In general, however, there is a single governmental department 
or ministry responsible for implementing and monitoring progress on a particular treaty. 
In Pakistan, overall implementation of Pakistan’s multilateral environmental agreements 
lies with the Ministry of Environment, Local Government & Rural Development. The 
key MEAs are all handled by the Ministry, typically with “desks” or “cells” for each 
agreement. 
However, Pakistan’s environmental policy and legal framework is not divided by 
Agreements, as indeed it shouldn’t be. The internationally acclaimed National 
Conservation Strategy provided the overall policy thrust for conservation after the Rio 
Summit. The NCS attempted to provide a broad framework for policy and action in 
environmental conservation, but also identified specific projects in fourteen core areas of 
conservation. It did not, however, link these to wider sustainable development goals, or 
with international trade policy.  
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Box 4 – Key MEAs Signed by Pakistan 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), 1975: aimed at ensuring that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants 
does not threaten their survival (www.cites.org). Pakistan’s principal obligations are to restrict the 
import and export of listed species of fauna and flora mentioned in Biodiversity Action Plan 2000. A 
range of legislative measures are recommended by the CITES secretariat and IUCN for 
implementation. 
Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the Stratosphere Ozone Layer, along 
with the Montreal Protocol, 1987: about the reduction of Ozone depleting substances such as 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), carbon tetrachloride and halons. The Ministry of Environment assumes 
sole responsibility for implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. An Ozone Cell has been 
established within the Ministry with the financial assistance of Multilateral Fund of the Montreal 
Protocol (www.environment.org.pk). 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, 1992: with the objectives of: 1) minimizing the generation of hazardous wastes 
as close possible to the source of their generation: 2) ensuring the environmentally sound 
management and disposal of hazardous waste: 3) preventing pollution from those wastes which are 
generated and: 4) minimizing the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: aimed at the protection of habitats, species 
and genes for future use (www.biodiv.org). 155 nations’ singing indicated their intention to form a 
global alliance to protect diversity, to shift to sustainable modes of resource use, and to make the 
necessary policy, economic and managerial adjustments to guarantee that the benefits to be gained 
from the use components of biodiversity are equitably shared across local, regional and global 
societies. 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 1992, along with the Kyoto 
Protocol, 1997: deals with a complex issue, having enormous potential economic impacts. The 
principal strategy of the FCCC is to change the pattern of future investment in favor of activities that 
generate less greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol distinguished between those countries with 
greenhouse gas limitation commitments and those without. Although neither the FCCC nor the Kyoto 
Protocol includes trade measures, it is highly likely that the parties, in fulfilling their Kyoto obligations, 
will adopt trade-restrictive policies and measures (www.unfccc.int). 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC), 1998: aimed at creating a 
system of notification to the international trade and transport of many goods domestically banned or 
severely limited. The convention allows developing countries to restrict the import of certain 
substances if they feel a need to do so. The Convention is based on Prior Informed Consent, a 
procedure that “helps participating countries learn more about the characteristics of potentially 
hazardous chemicals that may be shipped to them, initiates a decision making process on the future 
import of these chemicals by the countries themselves and facilitates the dissemination of this 
decision to other countries” (www.chem.unep.ch/pic). The aim of the participatory system is to 
promote a shared responsibility between trading countries to protect human health and the 
environment from the harmful effects of certain hazardous chemicals being traded internationally. 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD, 2000: addresses trade in most forms of 
living, genetically modified organisms and the risks it may present to biodiversity. It creates an 
advanced informed agreement system for such organisms to be introduced to the environment, and a 
less complex system for monitoring those intended to be used for animal consumption. The Protocol 
sets out a procedure for countries to decide whether to restrict imports of such goods, acting on the 
Precautionary Principle. A temporary inter-governmental committee governs the Protocol at the 
moment until the first Conference of Parties, yet to take place (www.biodiv.org/biosafety). 
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Trade Provisions in MEAs 
The seven MEAs listed above, and most of the others with minor trade conditions, 
have two different types of provisions that impact on international trade:  tariff and non-
tariff based containment or restriction of trade in certain goods and services; and the 
creation of market-based trading conditions that promote environmental conservation.  
After a mid-term review of the NCS in 2000, it was agreed that the NCS would be 
replaced by another sustainable development strategy, either in the form of a second NCS, 
or through the National Environment Action Plan. There remains, however, a major gap 
in terms of a central location for environmental conservation in national planning. 
Overall policy guidance in environmental concerns is formally provided by the 
Pakistan Environmental Protection Council, headed by the chief executive or prime 
minister of the country (or his/her nominee). PEPC, however, meets only infrequently, 
and is only distantly involved in accountability of Pakistan for its multilateral 
environmental commitments under various agreements. 
The Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 provides the legal umbrella for 
environmental action. The Act introduced the requirement for environmental assessments 
prior to approval of any development projects, and set up a network of Environment 
Protection Agencies and tribunals. However, the Act does not deal specifically with 
either MEAs or international trade. 
In sum, implementation of MEAs falls primarily within the scope of work of the 
Ministry, and neither policy nor legal support is adequately provided. Furthermore, there 
is no clear exchange with the Ministry of Commerce regarding the trade provisions 
within the various MEAs that Pakistan is a party to. 
 
1.5 Linkages between Trade and Environment  
The precise linkages between international trade and environment are multiple 
and complex, and can be understood in at least four dimensions: perspectives, physical 
impacts, laws and policies, and institutions.2  
Contrasting Paradigms 
The discourse around international trade can be divided into three distinct and 
conflicting perspectives, which capture the essence of the differences within and between 
the North and the South (Box 5). The trade perspective argues that international trade 
leads to greater economic growth for all, thus automatically benefiting human 
development. The environmental perspective maintains that policies not specifically 
aimed at conservation are unsustainable, and that international trade is fundamentally 
harmful to the natural resource base and hence the long-term prospects for human 
development. The development perspective (propounded by many Southern countries 
over the past decade and emerged as a proposal for a Development Box at Doha) holds 
                                          
2 These well-understood linkages are described in detail in UNEP and IISD, 2000. This is, of course, only one 
framework by which to understand the trade-sustainable development linkage, but a particularly useful one for the 
Pakistan context and for some of the recommendations that follow in this paper. 
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that international trade is in reality tilted to favor the “haves” over the “have-nots”, and 
that Northern countries must provide clearly specified allowances for less-developed 
countries. 
Much of the debate on trade and sustainable development, presented typically as a 
North-South divide, centers around the potential for the use of environmental measures 
by Northern importers to thwart developing country exports. This is paralleled by a 
general concern that provisions in many MEAs could be used to trump the WTO rules 
working for the benefit of developing countries in the form of freer trade. Pakistan has 
consistently held to this position, officially expounded in the Ministerials in Seattle and 
Doha, fed further by the perception of zero benefits from the integration of environment 
into the WTO discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOX 5 – Perspectives on Trade and Environment 
The Trade Paradigm  
• Trade creates the wealth that could be used to increase human well being. 
• But most national governments answer too directly to national industries, and will try to 
preserve domestic markets for these industries, keeping foreign competitors at bay. 
• In doing so, governments make their citizens worse off: domestic firms become inefficient, 
domestic consumers pay higher prices, and more efficient foreign firms are shut out.  
• The best protection is a strong system of rules against such behavior, such as WTO rules, 
by which all countries abide.  
• Even after signing such agreements, countries will look for loopholes. Banning or 
restricting goods on environmental grounds may be one such loophole. 
• Trade can actually be good for the environment, since it creates wealth that can be used 
for environmental improvement, and the efficiency gains from trade can mean fewer 
resources used and less waste produced.  
The environmental paradigm 
• The status quo seriously threatens the earth’s ecosystems. 
• But most national governments answer too directly to national industries, and will try to 
protect them against “costly” environmental demands.  
• In doing so, governments make their citizens worse off: domestic firm make profits, but 
the public subsidizes them by paying the costs of environmental degradation.  
• One way to avoid these problems is a strong system of rules spelling out clearly how the 
environment shall be protected, at the national and international levels. 
• Even after such rules are in place, governments and industry will look to scuttle them. 
Trade rules forbidding certain types of environmental regulations may be one way to do so.  
• Trade means more goods produced thus in many cases more environmental damage. The 
wealth created by trade will not necessarily result in environmental improvements. 
The development paradigm 
• Over one-fifth of the world’s population live in absolute poverty, most of them in 
developing countries, and the gap between the rich and poor countries continues to widen. 
Developing countries’ top priority should be reducing that poverty and narrowing that gap. 
• Openness to trade and investment may be key way to do so, by increasing exports, though 
the links between openness and economic growth are not automatic. 
• But rich countries protect their industries with subsidies, special trade rules and tariff 
systems that hurt developing country exports. 
• The best solution is strong set of multilateral rules against such behavior, but current WTO 
rules are too deeply influenced by the powerful trading nations, and liberalization has 
selectively benefited sectors of interest to developed countries.  
• Over time, as such behavior is outlawed by trade rules, rich countries will look for new 
ways to keep foreign competition out of their markets. Banning or restricting goods on 
environmental grounds may be one of those ways. 
• Demands that poor countries comply with rich country environmental standards are unfair, 
particularly if they are not accompanied by technical or financial assistance. Priorities 
differ; for example, in many poor countries clean water is paramount. And rich countries 
often caused most of the environmental damage in the first place. 
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Source: UNEP and IISD, 2000. 
 
From Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, through the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and up to the 
Agreement Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, environmental conservation and 
protection is given explicit importance in WTO. The WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment was formed in 1995 to examine issues central to the sustainability of 
international trade. The environment has become a progressively more important and 
hotly debated topic in the WTO discourse. At the Ministerial Conference held in Seattle 
in December 1999, environment was one of the nails in the coffin of talks to begin 
another round of trade negotiations. 
Physical Impacts 
At a very basic level, international trade (at the very least in goods) is based upon 
production, which is directly related to the state of natural resources. In countries such as 
Pakistan, where agriculture is of such vital importance, the environment is a key factor in 
determining how competitive a country’s exports are. Such physical effects (directly 
affecting economic factors) can be further understood in terms of: 
Product effects: the nature of the products being traded (exported or imported) 
has a direct impact on the environment, and hence the potential for sustainable 
development. Thus, for example, Pakistan’s import of chemical fertilizers (1,760,500 
metric tons in 2002-2003, up from 306,000 metric tons in 1970-71) has a direct negative 
effect on the quality of groundwater and food produce, thereby impacting negatively on 
health and human productivity. Similarly, trade in some goods have a positive impact on 
the environment, such as the import of pollution-reduction plants for the cement industry 
in Pakistan, or the export of organically grown mangoes. 
Scale effects: international trade, and more specifically the liberalization of trade, 
can affect the environment by expanding or shrinking the quantum or efficiency of 
economic activity. Increases or decreases in either can affect the environment directly by 
simply enhancing the scale of existing physical impacts, but can also have a more indirect 
impact by changing the allocation of resources to conservation. For Pakistan, the scale 
effects are minimal, with exports standing at an average of about 15% of GDP, unless the 
volume of trade increases substantively. Similarly, the volume of trade is not a prime 
force for efficiency improvements, apart from a few industries that are solely dependent 
on export. 
Structural effects: Lastly, international trade liberalization can affect a change in 
the structure of a domestic economy, by orienting it towards “trade-able” exports and 
generating a reliance on “necessary” imports. In line with the popularly expounded 
theory of “comparative advantage” any given country’s economy may be oriented 
towards more or less polluting industries, while a change in consumer demand patterns of 
an importing country may force an exporting country to re-orient its production sector in 
either direction. In the case of Pakistan, the situation is mixed with regard to the principal 
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exports, agricultural produce, textiles and leather: growing consumer demands for 
“green” food in the North is encouraging a shift towards more eco-friendly agriculture, 
while the comparative advantage of cheaper labor in the manufacturing sector is 
encouraging a shift towards more polluting industries (for which environmental 
mitigation may reduce their competitive edge). 
Laws and Policies 
One of the fundamental factors responsible for “chilling” North-South relations 
on trade and sustainable development is the potential for conflict perceived between the 
legal and policy regimes governing international trade and the environment. As 
mentioned earlier, the international trade regime is increasingly being governed by the 
World Trade Organization, although hundreds of bilateral agreements are also in effect 
and there are numerous countries still outside the ambit of the WTO. However, it is 
largely expected that sooner rather than later, the WTO rules and principles will govern 
global trade. The global policy and regime for environmental conservation, however, is 
not unified in a single institution, being governed rather by a collection of about 200 
multilateral and thousands of bilateral agreements. In addition, there are a host of other 
global regimes that govern domestic policies and laws with regard to human development, 
primarily stemming from the United Nations framework but still not unified 
institutionally as the WTO is. 
Trepidation stems from the fact that environmental and developmental legal and 
policy requirements increasingly dictate how a country must organize its economic 
structure, while international trade law is increasingly dictating how countries must 
formulate their environmental and developmental laws so as to be compatible with the 
goals of trade liberalization. With these overlapping requirements it is inevitable that 
conflicts may emerge nationally and internationally. For example, both WTO 
Agreements and MEAs grant the right of discrimination based on environmental quality, 
but while the WTO SPS Agreement confers the right to set standards on an international 
body, most MEAs confer this right on individual countries, while setting a minimum 
standard. At the same time, the WTO recognizes only product-related Process and 
Production Methods (PPMs) as a valid basis for discrimination, while environmentally it 
makes little sense for a distinction based on the end use of the product – the concern of 
most MEAs is how the product was made, not whether a “clean” product can be 
distinguished in its usage from a “dirty” one. 
Such differences between WTO and MEAs arise out of differences in perspective, 
core principles and dispute settlement mechanisms, and are discussed in detail in section 
2.3. 
Institutional Arrangements 
The key fact that the international trade regime is governed by a single entity, 
albeit an inclusive membership organization, and that environmental management is 
governed by a host of MEAs, each with its own unique implementation arrangement, is a 
recipe for conflict. 
In addition, the linkage between trade and environment is fundamentally affected 
by the driving principles behind each set of implementation arrangements. While the 
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MEAs rely essentially on complete transparency and as wide a level of public 
participation as is practically feasible, the WTO places conceptual restrictions on both the 
availability of information and participation in decision-making. The case of dispute 
settlement is notable, as the briefs submitted by the parties involved are typically 
restricted, and civil society participation in WTO is severely restricted. It is quite 
probable that the institutional arrangements of the trade regime have an impact on the 
outcome of environmental conservation by determining the efficacy of the institutional 
arrangements for environment. 
For Pakistan, the issue is of a very practical nature, as the different locations of 
institutional arrangements dealing with trade and MEAs creates an almost un-bridgeable 
disjoint. While the trade and environment institutions also have different global 
accountabilities, creating one level of concern, the goals are perceived to be very 
different for each at the national level; the result is a severe lack of communications and 
information exchange, particularly with regard to sustainable development as a bridge to 
join the two communities. 
The framework outlined above is only one way to understand trade-environment 
linkages. Another filter is the value chains approach, which examines the value addition 
and impact on the environment at each stage of a commodity’s production and trade. 
Such an approach yields similar conclusions, but with greater emphasis on the impact on 
the global competitiveness of a nation and its producers. 
 
1.6 In Sum: Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development 
While trade liberalization, governed by the WTO, and environmental 
conservation, governed by a set of MEAs, generates distinct and occasionally conflicting 
demands on parties, a country such as Pakistan needs to balance both in its search for 
long-lasting development. The concept of sustainable development (SD) introduced by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, offers a suitable 
umbrella under which to perform such a delicate balancing act. It is a potential bridge 
between these three perspectives. Certainly, a Pakistan-centric view would be to integrate 
the goals of poverty eradication, economic growth and conservation. This requires an 
inter-meshing of the three perspectives. 
A quick search on the World Trade Organization website leads to twelve 
substantive links for “sustainable development”, each leading to detailed research outputs 
or to further links. Only seven years after the World Commission on Environment and 
Development popularized the concept of sustainable development, the preamble to the 
Agreement establishing the WTO (the Marrakech Declaration of 15 April, 1994) declared 
its objective to be “expanding…production and trade… with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment…consistent with 
(members’) respective needs… at different levels of development.” 
  
 17 
The Doha Declaration also recognizes the importance of sustainable development 
in clause 513, although there is no explicit mention of what the term refers to, nor any 
detail on how it is to be integrated. The typically weak language in the text offers no clear 
guidelines for developing countries seeking to engage with WTO on a sustainable 
development platform.  
If indeed Pakistan is to make its way down a global one-way street, we need to sit up and 
shift gears or step aside. 
                                          
3 The section mandates the Committees on Trade and Environment, and Trade and Development to “act as a forum to 
identify and debate… the developmental and environmental aspects of [future] negotiations, in order to help achieve 
the objective of having sustainable development appropriately reflected.” 
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2. New Negotiations in Trade and Environment 
In this and the two chapters that follow, I would examine the change in the 
situation produced by the Doha Declaration through a clause-by-clause analysis. Rather 
than approach this as an abstract discussion, I have structured it in the form of concrete 
cases or examples. These examples illustrate the manner in which issues have been 
approached in the WTO—and therefore, how they are likely to be approached in the 
future—and also to place in context the underlying conceptual and practical problems. 
This chapter analyzes the implications of Clause 31 (Box 6). This clause pertains to an 
agreement to start negotiations on three areas: relationship between WTO rules and the 
trade obligations under MEAs; regular information exchange between WTO committees 
and MEA secretariats; and reduction of barriers on environmental goods and services. 
The South had earlier resisted the start of such a process of negotiations because of fears 
that it could lead to environmental conditionalities or might otherwise create competitive 
disadvantages for Southern exporters. We have approached the analysis by using the 
experience of the shrimp-turtle dispute (Box 7); this dispute brings out the various 
aspects of the conflict between trade and environment as well as that between the WTO 
and the MEAs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is followed by Chapter 3, which focuses similarly on Clause 32—namely the 
agreement to work on existing issues before the Committee on Trade and the 
Environment (CTE) of the WTO, including market access, TRIPS, and eco-labeling. This 
analysis is also approached through practical examples and illustrations. Finally, the 
implications of Clause 33 are analyzed from the perspective of how to move forward. 
 
2.1 The WTO and the MEAs 
There are fundamental differences in the philosophy, perspective, institutional 
mechanisms, and approach between the WTO and MEAs. The WTO is premised on the 
belief that international trade leads to economic growth, which brings prosperity to 
everyone, and that any benefits that may flow from barriers to the free flow of goods and 
services across national borders has to be weighed carefully against the costs of lost 
output and productivity; consequently, the WTO has tried to set up an ordered global 
regime, in which governments agree not to use domestic policies to obstruct trade except 
Box 6 - Doha Declaration, Clause 31 
With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, we agree to 
negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on: 
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the 
applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the  MEA in question.  The negotiations 
shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question; 
(i) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant 
WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status; 
(ii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental 
goods and services. 
We note that fisheries subsidies form part of the negotiations provided for in paragraph 28. 
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on justifiable grounds. The MEAs on the other hand, have generally led to commitments 
by countries to broad environmental principles, and to use government policy to realize 
these principles. Except possibly in the case of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), these have not begun to move in the direction of 
establishing a global regime; rather, these can at best be described as elements of a global 
moral regime—i.e. a joint commitment to an agreed set of principles—to be implemented 
through independent action by sovereign governments.  
Background: Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 
initiated the process of global environmental management and created the United Nations 
Environment Program. This was followed up most comprehensively two decades later at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro. The 
need for an environmental legal regime was expressed continuously, and developed as a 
set of multilateral agreements centered on particular environmental issues. The evolution 
of a non-unitary set of agreements is based on an important recognition: that the 
knowledge, constituency, urgency and implementation arrangements for different 
environmental issues are radically different. Thus, the requirements for protecting and 
preserving the Earth’s ecosystems are very different from the requirements of reducing 
carbon dioxide content in the Earth’s atmosphere. Implementation arrangements, in 
particular, are diverse and typically complex. As the agreements grew in number and 
depth, however, a common set of goals and principles has emerged as the foundation for 
global environmental management. 
The aims of most MEAs today are built around the definition of sustainable 
development offered by the World Commission on Environment and Development. 
While some MEAs specifically state their purpose as being directly beneficial, in a 
defined manner, to sustained human development, others maintain this as an implicit 
principle in the achievement of strictly environmental conservation goals. The stated aims 
of MEAs are different by necessity, ranging from reduction of the carbon dioxide content 
in the Earth’s atmosphere, to reduction in the loss of genetic, species and ecosystems 
diversity, to protection of oceans from oil pollution, to the barriers to the transport of 
hazardous waste material across national boundaries. 
The core principles of MEAs include prevention, precaution, participation, 
subsidiarity, responsibility, and equity. Prevention is more effective and cheaper than 
environmental cure, and in some cases it is the only option; that is, action must be based 
on the possibility of damage. The Precautionary Principle, widely recognized in natural 
sciences, states that lack of conclusive evidence does not justify inaction and, in fact, 
necessitates pro-active measures. Subsidiarity recognizes the fact that global impacts are 
due to local causes, and that responsibility needs to be devolved to the lowest level that 
can effectively respond. Common but differentiated responsibility requires the burden of 
environmental remedy and further prevention to be shared according to the national 
responsibility for the creation of the problem in the first instance. Similarly, the Polluter-
Pays-Principle requires those who create a problem to be the first ones held responsible 
to fix it. Openness requires both transparency and participation in decision-making. Intra- 
and inter-generational equity is based on essential rights to be respected, both presently 
and for the future. 
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On the principle that coercion has not generally led to sound environmental 
policies or positive environmental impacts, most MEAs do not contain dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Most operate on the basis of consent, while specific disputes 
are typically handled under regional or bilateral agreements. Consent typically requires 
active participation and free exchange of information, a feature of most MEAs designed 
to reduce the possibility of conflict. 
The South generally has few reservations about the principles of MEAs, 
particularly as it is equally affected by the global phenomena for which it is not 
responsible, and it is most affected by the pollution due to massive global relocation of 
manufacturing between the 1950s and 1990s. The concern is typically with the use of 
MEAs by the North for its own direct economic benefit, but not when the North is 
required to “clean up”. Another concern is that sustainable development tends to be 
overlooked in many cases where “purely” environmental concerns are being debated, at 
the cost of the single most important aspect of Southern policy: poverty eradication. 
Clause 31 and MEAs 
In Clause 31, the Doha Declaration recognizes the importance of the nexus 
between the WTO and the MEAs, and hence implicitly the tension between the two 
regimes, arguably as a result of the events in the last Ministerial in Seattle. However, the 
clause itself contains two important “cushions” for the trade perspective: 
1. The clause does not indicate in any manner the sort of relationship that might develop 
between the two regimes; it only mentions the goal as “enhancing the mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment” without the umbrella of sustainability or 
the development perspective. 
2. There is an explicit statement that future negotiations will focus only on the rights and 
obligations of countries that are members of both WTO and a particular MEA. On the 
one hand this offers an escape clause for countries that have not ratified the relevant 
MEAs (e.g. the US has not ratified the Cartagena Protocol of the CBD or the Kyoto 
Protocol of the UNFCCC); on the other hand, it leaves open the possibility of 
different rules for different countries, thus violating one of the cardinal principles of 
the WTO, namely a unitary implementation structure. 
The clause also deals with the same problem, but with an understanding that 
regular information exchange is needed between MEAs and the WTO secretariat for 
long-term solutions. The second phrase of the clause, however, is not innocent, as it goes 
to the root of principles of implementation in the two regimes. The WTO has traditionally 
been reluctant to open up participation in various processes (some Southern countries 
maintain that in practice, if not in letter, participation is even discouraged, such as by 
setting up a hectic schedule of negotiations that developing countries do not have the 
capacity to keep up with). MEAs, however, are based on open participation, and include 
an inclusive system of accreditation for civil society as well. 
 
2.2 The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Trade and Environment in Perspective 
The potential for conflict between trade and environment has been tested in a 
number of celebrated legal cases, including the tuna-dolphin case, the shrimp-turtle case; 
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disputes over attempts by transnational corporations to patent processes using basmati 
rice, and neem extract; and bilateral negotiations over measures to protect against the 
health impacts of production processes and materials (e.g., the banning of materials 
containing azo dyes).  
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The bottom line that emerges from an analysis of these cases is that while the 
WTO rulings did not provide complete satisfaction to environmentalists, they have by 
and large accepted environmental arguments as a basis for policy making. From these 
rulings, it appears likely that the final ruling would not have been very different were the 
dispute to have been placed before an MEA panel. Nevertheless, the basis for the ruling 
would in all likelihood have been different, and this might the major source of concern. 
In particular, while the WTO resolution of the issues has derived from a single, over-
arching principle, namely that a national policy should not discriminate between goods 
produced in various countries, the MEAs are premised on the alternative principle of 
Box 7 – The Shrimp-Turtle Case 
Background: Thousands of sea turtles drown every year when caught in shrimp nets. The 
US requires its shrimp fishers to use protective technology called Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs), a 
trap door by which turtles can escape from shrimp nets. In 1989, the US Congress banned import of 
shrimp caught without TEDs. 
How the WTO got involved: Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Thailand filed a complaint 
against the United States in 1996, claiming that the U.S. Turtle Shrimp Law violated international 
trade law by barring the importation of their shrimp and shrimp products. USA was accused of 
violating GATT article XX, which does not allow any arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries. 
What the WTO said: The WTO ruled in 1998 against the United States. Among the findings: 
the United States was discriminating by giving Asian countries only four months without any technical 
support to comply with the Turtle-Shrimp Law, but giving Caribbean Basin nations three years with 
technical assistance. 
The result: The United States revised its guidelines on the import of shrimp, changing both 
the method and the schedule by which it evaluated how well foreign shrimpers were doing at 
protecting sea turtles from drowning. The first beneficiary was Australia, which was allowed under the 
revised guidelines to export shrimp to the United States. 
How the United States sees it: Even though the United States lost the case, the Clinton 
administration claimed a partial victory after the Appellate body ruling in 1998 because the WTO 
recognized the validity of the U.S. Endangered Species Act. The administration claimed to have 
strengthened its protection for sea turtles in two ways: the National Marine Fisheries Service has 
increased its efforts to provide technical training to other countries in the design, construction and 
installation of TEDs, and the State Department has intensified efforts to negotiate an agreement on 
turtle protection in the Indian Ocean. 
How Pakistan sees it: Although the case was won by the developing countries, the basis 
for judgment did not allow for the precedent intended. In fact many members of the trade policy 
community in Pakistan see the judgment as a loss, not least because of the loss to the sizeable 
shrimp industry in the country and because technical assistance for TEDs is still not widely available. 
More importantly, Pakistan is concerned about the precedent this sets, in that environmental 
standards have been implicitly accepted by the WTO as valid grounds for trade restrictions: the 
settlement only rejected the differential treatment of Asian versus Caribbean countries by the USA. 
How environmentalists see it: Environmentalists said that United States weakened its law 
protecting shrimp turtles, and created a loophole already being exploited by Australia and Brazil. The 
second WWF civicus amicus brief showed that the panel ruling of 6 April 1998 included major 'legal 
and interpretative errors' in assessing the 'environmental exception' under GATT Article XX. Asian 
environmentalists are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they are concerned that the sea turtle is 
indeed in danger of extinction and deep-sea shrimp fishing without TEDs does contribute seriously to 
their decimation. On the other hand, they are bothered greatly by the US move to apply its domestic 
law to activities that take place outside US jurisdiction. The US ban, to them, seeks to achieve a 
desirable objective an undesirable approach: unilateralism (Bello, 1997). For Asian environmentalists, 
restrictions ought to be applied not only to shrimps harvested in the wild but also to those that are 
produced in environmentally damaging aquaculture farms, but this should be done according to clear-
cut rules of multilateral environmental agreements that are negotiated among counties. Moreover, 
trade restrictions should be paralleled by positive moves that compensate the affected producers and 
provide for technology transfer that would assist them to shift to more sustainable Production Process 
Methods (PPMs). 
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national implementation, in which discrimination is not only tolerated but often 
welcomed. The negotiations process over the linkages between WTO rules and trade 
obligations under the MEAs has to contend precisely with this contrast in underlying 
principles. 
These inherent tensions are amply demonstrated in the famous shrimp-turtle case, 
in which Pakistan was a party to a dispute filed with the WTO (Box 7). Analysis of this 
case, which remains one of the most extensive instances of an environmental dispute at 
the WTO, can shed light on the simple question: what would have happened had the case 
gone to the relevant MEA, in this case the Convention on Biological Diversity? If the 
outcome were to be completely different, that would be evidence of a conflict in uniting 
both regimes; if the outcome were to be roughly the same there may be enough hope of 
harmonious unifying of two in the interest of sustainable development goals. 
The background of the case is provided in Box 7. Briefly, the dispute arose over 
the 1989 decision by the US Congress to ban the import of shrimp caught without the use 
of turtle exclusion devices (TEDs).4 In 1996, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Thailand 
filed a complaint that the US law violated GATT article XX, which prohibits arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries. The WTO initially ruled against the US in 
1998, on the grounds that the US law discriminated between the petitioners and the 
Caribbean countries, since the latter had been given a longer adjustment period and 
provided with technical assistance. The US revised its guidelines on shrimp imports, 
changing both the method and the schedule by which it evaluated how well foreign 
shrimp exporters were doing in protecting sea turtles. In consequence, the WTO 
Appellate Body revised the earlier ruling in October 1998, and accepted the US plea that 
it was justified in imposing restrictions to protect “exhaustible natural resources”. A 
feature of the initial ruling as well as the subsequent reversal by the Appellate Body is 
that environmental arguments were accepted by the WTO as grounds for restriction of 
trade, based on GATT Article XX, sections (b) and (g). 
The primary problem in comparing the WTO Dispute Settlement and a potential 
resolution under the CBD is that while environmental measures are clearly spelled out in 
WTO Agreements (Box 8), international trade provisions are less clear in MEAs. Of the 
few MEAs that do spell out trade measures, most of them are targeted at very specific 
items, which are not the bone of contention in any case, such as trade in endangered 
species, the transport of hazardous waste or disposal and retrieval of objects returning 
from space. The CBD itself is not clear about specific measures to restrict trade. 
What is clear is that the two regimes (MEA and WTO) use very different 
principles and perspectives to approach the same problem. The WTO ruled on the 
grounds that the US was not justified in imposing a restriction on Asian countries that it 
was imposing differently on Caribbean countries (violation of the most-favored nation 
principle). At the same time, the precedent was set for future rulings in favor or 
environmental protection measures to restrict trade.  
                                          
4 TEDs are small aluminum frames inserted into shrimp fishing nets. They are neither technologically complicated nor 
very expensive. The main obstacle in adapting to the new policy might have been social in nature. In countries where 
shrimp fishing is a small-scale operation managed by illiterate or semi-literate rural fisherfolk, introducing innovations 
is not a simple matter. This itself can create a competitive advantage for countries, whose industry is organized along 
different lines. 
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The CBD and other environmental agreements are premised on the argument that 
policy needs to be used proactively to protect endangered species. Consequently, in the 
present case, the argument would mean that it is legitimate to ban any trade or domestic 
consumption of shrimps that contributes unnecessarily to the death of sea turtles. 
Although the initial decision may have turned out to be the same, the body of case law 
developed would be sufficiently different to have set a precedent for future cases. 
Furthermore, any possible appeals procedure in the CBD or other MEA would not have 
overturned the initial ruling, as happened in the WTO. 
In order to explore the issue further, it is important to highlight an additional point, 
namely that the perspective of sustainable development is not sufficiently integrated in 
the manner that this petition was presented or defended. Pakistan and the other appealing 
countries did not argue from an integrated sustainable development perspective. This 
would have required an understanding of the impacts of the case on poor fisher folk 
engaged in shrimp fishing, and the broader economic importance of sustaining marine 
life. In such an argument, Pakistan and it co-plaintiffs may well have placed the 
following arguments at the center: 
1. there is no dispute on the need to install turtle exclusion measures in order to preserve 
rare marine turtles; 
2. shrimp fishing in Pakistan is done largely by independent fishers, who are generally 
poor, illiterate (or semi-literate) and unorganized – even though they are members of 
the coherent rural communities. This makes the task of introducing new technology 
more complicated for both social and practical reasons. It also complicates the task of 
providing credit for purchase of this technology. 
3. the economic case for shrimping, particularly for poor fishing communities but also 
as an integrated part of the developing economy of Pakistan (including the industry 
associated with industry); 
4. the fact that Pakistan, and other developing countries, simply do not have the 
financial resources to make TEDs a necessary feature in shrimp-nets; 
5. restrictions against non-TED shrimp fishing are inherently discriminatory against 
developing countries at large, and not against particular countries in view of 3 above; 
and 
6. all countries are willing to comply with TED-shrimp farming within a specified time 
frame, provided there is adequate support from those who can give it to ensure that 
the adequate knowledge and technology are transferred and that monitoring is tied in 
with the transfer of adequate technology. 
The case illustrates the fact that “green protectionism” exists even under the WTO 
umbrella. The only manner in which MEAs would have made this a stronger threat would 
have been a threat by an importing country to apply a law exclusively against other 
countries. In either case, however, a sustainable-development centered argument would 
have been more compelling. In the absence of such an argument, the CBD could have 
ruled that trade restrictive measures were completely justified, and that they should be 
applied to all the shrimp farming industry regardless of the country of origin or the nature 
of shrimp farmers. 
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The concrete lesson for Pakistan in this case is that whatever regime such a 
dispute is referred to, the country would have to start developing TED capacity in its 
shrimp farming industry, both to allow its shrimps to be imported and to prevent a rare 
species from extinction. Thus, regardless of the potential problems of bringing WTO and 
MEAs into sync (and the case demonstrates that there are problems in principles and 
perspectives), the general lesson for Pakistan is that both regimes would require 
significant capacity building in production in areas with overlaps. In particular, the case 
points to the need for well-researched capacity development and provision of information 
to relevant communities. There is a need for improvement in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors to cope with emerging, well-organized environmental responsibilities 
to cope in the international market. 
The argument used in the WTO ruling (that the US was differentiating between 
Asian and Caribbean countries and hence Article XX of GATT was being abused) does 
not allow for any targeted discrimination in the future. However, the ruling does create an 
opening for environment-related standards to be imposed under GATT, Article XX, as 
long as the country applying it does so uniformly. Under such circumstances, Southern 
producers, with fewer capacity building resources at their disposal, would be at a 
disadvantage to Northern producers (domestic or exporters) who have the capacity to 
adapt or the means by which to develop such capacity. 
The Shrimp-Turtle case, thus, brings out the potential problems in uniting MEAs 
and WTO, as per Article 31 of the Doha Declaration, in all dimensions: perspective, 
principles and institutional arrangements. However, the important result for Pakistan is 
that its own sustainable development goals (both freer and fairer trade) will involve 
substantial capacity building. 
It is worth mentioning here that capacity building itself is a vague term, as 
discussed in chapter 4. Turtle Excluder Devices themselves are fairly inexpensive and 
simple, consisting of a roughly square meter of aluminum that should cost no more than 
Rs. 300 (US$ 5) per piece to produce. However, the “social technology” to introduce, 
replicate and adapt to the physical technology is more troubling, particularly for the 
majority of coastal shrimp farmers. At the same time, while monitoring mechanisms “on 
the boat” are virtually impossible to assure, there may well be requirements for such 
measures “on-shore”. Once again, though, the fact that such measures may now be 
introduced reflects a significant potential threat to other exporters. 
As soon as sustainable development is introduced as a long-term policy objective, 
it raises an important issue, namely assessment of the impact of specific agreements on 
the policy goal. Presently, developed countries have initiated a number of studies to build 
a decent framework for such assessment. However, these frameworks tend be partial and 
fragmented in character. In other words, they look separately at the impact on natural 
resources and the environment, social equity and poverty, and economic growth. 
Developing countries have not, by and large, initiated any efforts at assessment or 
at building the appropriate framework for assessment. As a result, it becomes difficult for 
policy makers as well as negotiators to take a strong position on disputed issues on the 
basis of its sustainable development impact. Furthermore, most mainstream assessments 
by Northern researchers do not start from a pro-poor framework, in which the 
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vulnerability, coping capacity, and livelihood strategies of the poor become the basis for 
assessing policies or international agreements. Nor do they take a pro-development 
approach, in which the position of Southern producers in the global value chain is taken 
as a staring point for the assessment.  
If the South is to play a significant role in global negotiations, it needs to ensure 
that such assessments take place regularly within the South, and also that the assessment 
framework used globally is the one that places the policy objectives of the South at its 
center5. 
 
2.3  Tensions between MEAs and WTO Agreements 
Perspective Freer trade always increases 
wealth, economic growth and, 
hence, well-being of all those 
involved in more trade. 
 
However, some restrictions on 
trade need to be placed in carefully 
defined places to protect human 
and environmental health from 
being harmed by trade. 
Human well-being is 
inextricably linked to 
environmental health, and freer 
trade sometimes harms the 
environment. 
 
What is needed is a targeted set 
of agreements that can pro-
actively protect the environment, 
and liberalize or restrict trade as 
necessary. 
Principles Most-favored nation treatment 
National treatment 
No discrimination between “like” 
products that cannot be 
distinguished in their commercial 
use 
Prevention 
Precaution 
Subsidiarity 
Common and differentiated 
responsibility 
Openness 
Polluter-pays 
Inter/intra-generational equity 
Implementation 
Approach 
Countries will protect their own 
limited interests, and compliance 
has to be enforced through 
uniform rules. This requires a 
single, strong enforcement and 
regulatory agency 
 
States subsume some of their 
rights to a global entity 
Countries are sovereign actors 
and will define their own 
agendas in light of the greater 
common good. This requires 
trusting nations to formulate 
laws and policies for the greater 
good 
 
States retain their sovereignty 
Institutional 
Implementation 
Single implementing and 
monitoring entity (WTO) 
Governmental responsibility 
Multiple institutions 
Governmental responsibility 
Maximum possible participation 
                                          
5 The impact of trade liberalization and WTO imperatives on Pakistan may be assessed from the perspectives of rights 
of Pakistani producers, their ability to cope with changes and their competitiveness in the global market. 
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Limited participation 
Clearly identified and linked up 
domestic compliance 
Clearly identified but not inter-
linked mechanisms 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Clearly spelled out dispute 
resolution and appeal process 
Focus on settlement negotiations 
Reverse consensus supports the 
politically weaker parties 
indirectly 
No clear or uniform mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The threat of “green protectionism” is a very real one for Pakistan under either 
regime. This necessitates a two-pronged approach: first, taking a negotiating position that 
does not rely on blanket agreements or disagreements on trade and environment, but 
places sustainable development as a guiding principle, and argues for its application on a  
In reality, there is little evidence of outright conflict breaking out between 
implementation of an MEA and a WTO Agreement. However, the prospect of such 
conflict, stemming from these differences, is enough to “freeze” relations between the 
distinct communities. The potential for such a conflict is clear by the differences as 
counter-posed above. The differences stand out when “green” (or environmental) 
provisions in the WTO (Box 8) are contrasted with trade provisions in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (Box 9). 
 
 
Box 8 – “Green” Provisions in the WTO 
• GATT, Article III: the legal expression of the national-treatment principle, preventing 
discrimination between “like” products. However, the lack of clarity on what constitutes “like” 
products has environmental implications, as there is still a debate on whether products with 
different environmental impacts may be treated as different, and hence suitable for separate 
treatment. 
• GATT, Article XI: prohibiting volume-based measures that can distort trade, such as quotas, 
import/export licenses and similar measures. This is in direct conflict with measures under some 
of the MEAs, for example the Basel Convention imposing licensing requirements for trade in 
hazardous materials. 
• GATT, Article XX: the most explicit environmental provisions maintain that, under certain 
conditions, policies affecting trade in goods for protecting human, animal or plant life or health, 
and “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” are exempt from normal GATT 
disciplines. Such exemptions typically pass through a series of stringent tests. 
• Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: specifies tariff and non-tariff measures to restrict 
trade, based on performance, environmental, health or other standards used by the producer. 
Typically, such standards are defined internationally, although a Code of Good Practice lists 
optimum standards. 
• Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards: covers standards essential to protect 
humans, animals and plants from specific hazards associated with transportation. The Agreement 
specifies conditions under which it may be invoked and ground rules for defining the standards 
internationally, including a temporary provision for the Precautionary Principle. 
• Agreement on Agriculture: defines the conditions under which environmental programs may be 
exempt from cuts in subsidies. 
• Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties: specifies that subsidies be permitted (up to 
20% of a firm’s costs) for adapting to new environmental laws. 
• Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: governments can refuse 
patent applications that threaten human, animal or plant life or health, or risk serious damage to 
the environment. 
• General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article 14: policies affecting trade in services for 
protecting human, animal or plant life or health are exempt from normal GATS disciplines under 
certain, specifie  conditions. 
Process and production methods (PPMs) are a central feature of the trade and 
environment debate at the WTO. The WTO distinguishes between 
• Product related PPMs: resulting in products that can be distinguished in terms of their use, 
handling or disposal. The WTO allows countries to discriminate on the basis of product-related 
PPM, as long as the discrimination is maintained agai st local products and products from all 
countries and can be justified under some trade exception provided by an Agreement; 
• Non-product related PPMs: resulting in products that can NOT be distinguished in their use, 
handling or disposal. The WTO does NOT allow countries to discriminate against products on the 
basis of a non-product related PPM, simply because it is not in favor of such a PPM, even if it 
makes the same discrimination against its own products. 
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The tensions between MEAs and WTO Agreements emerge from three distinct 
levels, as inferred from the hypothetical extension of the Shrimp-Turtle case: different 
perspectives on the manner in which to achieve the end result of “well being”; distinct, 
and occasionally conflicting, principles by which the two regimes are set up; and 
differences in implementation, enforcement and dispute settlement. 
These differences need to be understood clearly for Pakistan to develop its 
position, after further careful consideration, on the MEA-WTO linkage issue. 
 
Dimension WTO Agreements MEAs 
 
case-by-case basis; and second beginning to identify capacity building needs 
immediately in all areas that might be sensitive to MEA application or could take 
advantage of MEA provisions. In the first strand, there is a need to advocate for the 
global and national integration of mechanisms with sustainable development as the 
defining goal, and for an exchange of information to that end, both globally and 
nationally. In the second strand, there is a need to develop indigenous research capacity. 
 
 
Box 9 – Trade Provisions in Key MEAs 
Key MEAs TRADE PROVISIONS 
Basel Convention on the 
Control of 
Transboundary 
Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal 
Article 4.1.(a) (b) (c): Parties may only export a hazardous 
waste to another party that has not banned its import and that 
consents to the import in writing. 
Article 4.2(g): Parties can prevent the import of hazardous 
wastes if they have reason to believe that the wastes will not be 
managed in an environmentally sound manner. 
Article 5: Parties may not export hazardous or other waste to, or 
import from, a non-Party. 
Article 6.3 (a) (b): Waste movement may not commence until 
written consent is received 
The Convention on 
International Trade in 
Endangered Species 
(CITES) 
Article II: The species threatened with extinction must be 
subject to particularly strict trade regulation in order not to 
further endanger their survival and trade must only be authorized 
in exceptional circumstances. 
Article III: Trade in endangered species is only allowed in strict 
accordance with declared provisions. 
Articles IV and VI: Regulating and monitoring is provided for 
through permits, quotas and other restrictive measures. 
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Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete 
the Stratospheric Ozone 
Layer 
Articles 4.1 and 4.2: Ban all trade in the substances defined as 
ozone-depleting between parties and non-parties. 
Articles 4.3 and 4.4: Specifies a phased implementation. 
Articles 4.5 to 4.8: Excludes technologies for the destruction of 
ozone-depleting substances 
Article 4B: Parties to implement systems for licensing and 
control of trade in ozone-depleting substances by January 2005. 
Rotterdam Convention 
on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade 
Article 10.2 and 10.4: Parties can decide, from the 
Conventions’ agreed list of chemicals and pesticides, which ones 
they cannot manage safely and, therefore, not import. Such 
decisions must be communicated to the Secretariat. 
Article 11.1 (a) (b): Exporting parties shall devise legislation to 
ensure compliance with consenting decisions. 
Article 11.1 (c): Exporting parties shall advise and assist 
importing parties to “strengthen their capacities” to manage 
chemicals safely. 
Article 12.1 and 12.3: Exporting parties must provide adequate 
notice if export of restricted chemicals takes place. 
Article 13: When trade in controlled substances does take place, 
labeling and information requirements must be followed 
according to international standards. 
Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety  
Article 6.2: Recognizes the right of any Party to “subject all 
living modified organisms to risk assessment prior to decisions 
on import to set standards for contained use”. 
Article 10: Parties may restrict the import of some living 
genetically modified organisms as part of a carefully specified 
risk management procedure. 
Article 10.6: Parties may use the precautionary principle to 
restrict trade of living modified organisms. 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity 
No direct mention of international trade restrictions of 
promotion. 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 
No direct mention of international trade restrictions of 
promotion. There is now, however, a move towards the 
promotion of trade in emissions credits, to reduce the balance of 
global emission. 
Source: Various  
  
 30 
2.4 Environmental Goods and Services 
The final section of Article 31 refers to the possibility of expanding trade in 
environmental goods and services (EGS). This has been a long sought-for win-win 
scenario in the potential trade and environment conflict, allowing for trade liberalization 
along with environmental protection. Such products typically include technology (both 
goods, such as waste treatment plants, chemicals that can reduce waste content in 
particular processes, water-conserving machinery, etc. and services, such as consulting, 
techniques for re-use and disposal of pigments and dyes, etc.) for cleaner production. 
Qutub (2001) further divides EGS into preventive (“in-house” treatment) and curative 
(“end-of-pipe”) measures. 
This issue stumbles against a market block: the demand for EGS in the South 
(where it is most needed) does not match the price of such goods and services in the 
North (where it is most available). The way forward, it turns out, is for a demand for 
subsidized provision of EGS, support for capacity building to enable such services to be 
created within Southern countries, and their encouragement for developing an additional 
demand for such services from the North. Such a dynamic may well lower the price of 
these products both by making the technology available within the South, and by 
increasing the scale of production in the North as well as the South. At the moment, most 
of the clean production measures initiated by the private sector itself are for limited 
reasons and of limited scope. 
Much of the effort in technology transfer to date has been in the form of grants. In 
Pakistan, grant-based projects such as the Environmental Technology Program for 
Industries and the Technology Transfer for Sustainable Industrial Development have 
managed to generate some momentum. This has been accompanied by growing civil 
society pressure to put into place cleaner production systems and comply with the 
National Environmental Quality Standards. Initially, there was some interest in donor 
countries to follow up on these projects with credit lines that would enable individual 
producers to obtain the requisite services from international sources. However, this 
interest does not seem to have been pursued actively by the Government of Pakistan. 
The impact of this section of Clause 31 in the Declaration is, thus, limited 
especially in the context of the other provisions within the Declaration. One of the key 
concerns is the absence of an accepted definition of “environmental goods and services”. 
It is quite possible under current trends that inherently biodegradable products (such as 
raw jute or cotton-based goods) can be qualified under this heading, thus benefiting 
developing countries from a number of angles. However, most developing countries are 
wary of such a step, because it would leave open an option to fully introduce Process and 
Production Methods (PPMs: Box 8) into the WTO mechanism. At the same time, leaving 
the issue open for continuous interpretation leaves open the chance that developed 
countries will push through import liberalization in services that can only marginally be 
considered “environmental”. 
Future negotiations will focus on exactly such a definition. The acclaimed 
newsletter Bridges (ICTSD, 2001) clarifies that the “spectrum of views in both the trade 
and environment communities appear to range from a narrow definition that would 
regard environmental goods as equipment or technologies required for environmentally 
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sound production of final goods and ‘end-of-the-pipe’ pollution treatment equipment, to 
broader ones based on environmental characteristics of the goods themselves and/or their 
production process.” 
This wide range is, again, a potential threat and opportunity for Pakistan, 
requiring a pro-active definition to be developed and advocated for in light of sustainable 
development imperatives. The likely starting point is the WTO Secretariat definition 
proposed in March 1998: 
“The environment industry consists of activities which produce goods and 
services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct environmental damage to water, 
air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems. These include 
cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk and 
minimize pollution and resource use although there is currently no agreed methodology 
which allows their contribution to be measured in a satisfactory way.” 
The broader view of EGS would include any good that would not have a negative 
impact on the environment, compared with “like” products that would. Such a broad view 
would have serious implications for Pakistan and for Northern countries. On the one hand, 
Pakistan does not have the capacity to move its nascent industry into “cleaner 
production”, nor can it afford for Process and Production Methods (PPMs) to be made 
valid grounds for discrimination in WTO. On the other hand, it has a comparative 
advantage in agricultural products, which it could ask to be classified as “environmental 
goods” and take advantage of the reduced tariffs. 
Likewise, the North would also be seriously tested with such a broad definition. 
Although it may allow it the freedom to apply environmental standards to restrict 
Southern trade and allow it enhanced market access in clean production technology, a 
broad view of EGS may also force it to accord preferential treatment to sustainably 
produced goods from the South, such cotton products. 
At the moment, there is little scope for such a broad definition of EGS to be 
introduced into future negotiations, although some have voiced concerns in this regard. 
For now, it is most likely that a restricted definition of the term will be introduced, both 
because the North is not willing to take a chance on the implications and because the 
South has little capacity to take advantage of a broad-based definition. However, it is 
unlikely that liberalization will take place even under the narrow definition of EGS, 
because of market constraints of demand and supply.  
Pakistan can take advantage of the present mood, and push for a restricted 
definition of EGS, as above. However, the convergence between sustainable development 
and trade trends globally, and the growing civic pressure domestically, mean that such a 
position cannot be held to for very long. There is, thus, a need to start giving indications 
for a “conditional agreement” to a broader definition of EGS, provided that its acceptance 
is made contingent to capacity building steps by the North. In a long-term perspective, 
such an option is also clearly desirable for Pakistan, as its own industry (including 
agriculture) is beginning to have severely damage human and environmental health. 
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Source: Arshad Zaman Associates, 2000. 
Box 10 – Private Sector Initiatives for Clean Production 
Lessons from the few initiatives taken by the private sector are relevant to Pakistan’s import 
and export of environmental goods and services for sustainable industries. Some of the sporadic 
actions have been reported as being undertaken purely on moral grounds. In most cases, however, 
the driving forces for industry, reported by their own representatives (Arshad Zaman Associates, 
2000), have been external. These include: 
 In some cases, multi-national companies in Pakistan follow the rules of their home countries, 
which normally involve stricter environmental and social regulations. In a few cases, they also 
force their subsidiaries or related companies up and down the supply chain to follow those same 
rules; 
 Large-scale national industries, particularly those geared towards exports, are now improving 
their businesses as pre-requisites for ISO 9000 or 14000 certifications. This certification is 
becoming a necessity for the export market even if it is largely ignored within the country; 
 Regardless of certification requirements, exporting industries increasingly have to respond to a 
discerning export market. Consumers now, particularly in “developed” countries are more 
conscious of social and environmental standards of production than before. Clean industries stand 
a better chance of improving profits than sloppy ones; 
 Consumer and local community awareness campaigns have also forced the private sector to sit 
up and take notice of environmental concerns. Residents in area plagued by industrial pollution 
are now mobilized by civil society and the experiences elsewhere to demand cleaning up 
processes. 
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3. A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN 
Clause 32 of the Doha agreement singles out three of the more important issues 
on the agenda of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), requiring it to 
report on these issues at the next Ministerial Conference. These issues are market access, 
TRIPs, and eco-labeling. Following upon the previous discussion, I look at these issues 
from a perspective that places sustainable development at the centre. This perspective 
requires a review of the overall stance towards the issues, as well as the nature of policies 
that would best serve the national interest, and the type of support that would be required 
for the purpose.  
The key question in this review is the need for the policy making process in 
Pakistan to come to grips with a fundamental shift in the global economy, a shift in which 
the source of wealth creation is no longer the direct control or processing of natural 
resources but rather the control and use of knowledge and information. This shift means 
that profitability and productivity depend to an unprecedented degree on the “information 
content” of products—including reliable information about product and process, 
information about consumer preferences, and information embedded in research and 
development. The bulk of Southern producers are concentrated in low-end production 
segments, characterized explicitly by a low-information content of the product. Many 
conflicts in the trade and environment arena can be interpreted in terms of the differential 
impact of policies on low-end producers—namely those producing output with low 
information content—and high-end producers, whose goods and services have high 
information content.  
 
3.1 Environmental Measures and Market Access 
Market access is at the heart of the debate over trade and environment. 
Traditionally, Southern governments opposed the introduction of environmental issues 
into trade policies because of fears that these would lead to the erection of barriers 
against Southern exports, which they would not be able to overcome without access to 
resources or technology. The celebrated cases listed in the previous section support this 
argument. For example, Pakistan lost at least two years of shrimp exports to the US 
because of the latter’s unilateral policy, a policy that was in the end endorsed by the 
WTO Appellate Body’s ruling on the Shrimp-Turtle case. 
The market-access argument is a very potent one. An important counter-argument, 
namely that the actual impact of the introduction of such standards has been quite low—
seems to miss the point. In the case of Pakistan, for example, the only detailed study was 
conducted by UNCTAD in 1996 based on 1993 data (cited in Qutub, 2001). This study 
estimates that in 1993 only US$317 million—or 5 per cent of the aggregate volume—of 
exports were “sensitive” to environmental measures. Even if one assumes that current 
ratios would not be significantly different—despite the massive increase in environmental 
awareness since then—the issue is quite different. The point is that it is not the actual 
impact but the potential impact that makes a different. For example, for Pakistan, the 
entire situation would change dramatically if environmental arguments were to be 
introduced by some country on cotton or cotton products, Pakistan’s major export 
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commodity. The key issue is the capacity of Pakistani producers to cope with potential 
actions, regardless of whether these are undertaken under the WTO or the MEAs.  
Thus, although the impacts have been minimal thus far, this does not minimize 
the need to be wary of the threat posed by application of environmental standards. 
However, such wariness could take a number of forms, including a continuous 
investment in the capacity of producers to respond to future threats; assessing a broad 
range of impacts produced by such measures; and enabling policy makers as well as 
producers to anticipate and overcome the problems rather than be dominated by them.  
Given the direct relationship of market access to export promotion and therefore 
economic development, it makes sense to focus on this as a major indicator of the 
positive or negative impact of a proposed measure. However, this focus can take at least 
two very different forms. The conventional form, on which much earlier policies and 
negotiating positions were based, is to use this indicator virtually to the exclusion of all 
other indicators of economic or social development; this approach addresses neither the 
determinants nor the entire range of consequences of market access or the proposed 
measure. An alternative approach is to assess the proposed measure in terms of its 
aggregate impact on the prospects for (sustainable) social and economic development; 
and examine a variety of options that can be combined to overcome its adverse impacts 
while maximizing the positive spin-offs.  
 
The apprehension…that non-tariff barriers to trade are being introduced in the guise of 
environment, child labor…[represents] a myopic vision by business, [which] will and can 
only lead to environmental disasters. A broader vision and an acknowledgment of the 
benefits, monetary as well as societal, are needed. The realization is needed that the 
issues that are being termed as a form of non-tariff barriers are essentially detrimental to 
the national economy and the survival of life as we know it…. Even if legislation by 
importing countries is not introduced, it is more probably that the individual importing 
companies, due to consumer pressure, will exert pressure for environmental compliance. 
---Mahmood Ahmed, Vice-President, FPCCI, 1998 
The first response is mono-focal in character; its only objective is to block any 
measure that threatens the market access of Pakistani products. The latter response is 
more nuanced. It asks: 
(a) what is the impact of the proposed measure on an entire range of policy goals: 
market access, equity, environmental conservation, or poverty? ; and  
(b) what kind of ancillary or supportive measures—e.g. capacity building, access 
to technology, community development—would help the country overcome the direct 
adverse impact on exports.  
In the case of the shrimp-turtle dispute, for example, policy makers could 
legitimately have been expected to assess the aggregate impact of the US policy on the 
entire range of objectives: national economic development, the welfare of the fishing 
community, the shrimp population, the turtle population, and coastal resources in general. 
More importantly, it may have also been useful to explore a number of policy options that 
together might have led to win-win scenarios—e.g. those in which the capacity of the 
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local fishing community could have been enhanced to enable them to engage in 
sustainable fishing, thus achieving growth, equity, and environmental objectives 
simultaneously.  
Failure to explore such options is resulting in an enormous “credibility gap”, 
which impacts all other aspects of the negotiations (Najam, 2000). Northern governments 
and the environmental lobby claim that developing countries are simply not interested in 
applying necessary environmental standards—even when the trade impacts are minimal. 
This has reduced the ability of Southern countries to make negotiating gains in other 
fields, including implementation of past agreements by the North. 
Finally, the reality of environmental considerations in international trade is that 
MEA or WTO measures are only one aspect facing Pakistani and other Southern 
exporters. At the moment, while few such measures are being legally enforced, producers 
have to contend with growing consumer awareness and preference for “cleaner” and 
“safer” goods. Whether the WTO enforces eco-labeling or not, and whether goods 
produced in an eco- or socio-unfriendly manner are passed through the importing borders 
or not, the test for the producer is the customer. The customer is, increasingly, demanding 
labels to know the history and the production process and the environmental implications 
of the good that s/he is consuming. There is a clear need for building capacity purely to 
remain competitive in an ever more informed and discerning market place. 
Market Access: A Necessary but not a Sufficient Condition 
Conceptually, too, the advocacy of increased market access is based on the 
assumption that increased exports will automatically lead to substantial economic growth 
which, in turn, will lead to significant human development (through the trickling down of 
the increased wealth at the top of the income bracket, and through increased public 
investment in social services). These assumptions have turned out to be incomplete and 
on occasion even misleading.  
Recent evidence shows that the determining factor in economic growth is not the 
volume of trade but the pattern of trade. Thus countries that specialize in sectors where 
the global volume of trade is expanding will do better than those which are stuck in 
sectors with shrinking trade shares. Even in a single sector, different segments of 
commodity chain exhibit different properties.6 Countries that do well economically are 
those that manage to graduate to more profitable and dynamic segments of the 
commodity chain. Certain segments of the production chain produce more “economic 
rents”, or mark-ups per unit cost, than others. In the case of the cotton commodity chain, 
for example, value added, economic rents, and profitability are concentrated in retailing 
and marketing, in which profitability and growth are driven by specialization in ancillary 
activities: certification, labeling, advertising, and consumer management. In contrast, 
                                          
6 The commodity chain approach examines the entire production system from raw material to final retail product of a 
single commodity. For example, the cotton commodity chain stretches from cotton farming to ginning, spinning, 
weaving, finishing, garment manufacturing, and retail marketing of finished garments. The commodity chain approach 
looks at the entire production system as an integrated entity, in terms of the geographical dispersion of production, the 
technology and production process, and the system of governance of the chain. The last-mentioned is assessed in terms 
of the production structures in various segments of the chain; in particular, oligopolistic segments tend to be dominant 
in comparison with competitive segments. Excess economic rents also tend to accumulate in the oligopolistic segments 
of the chain.  
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cotton growing, ginning, and spinning activities are low value-added segments, in which 
growth takes place mainly through increased extraction of natural resources or linear 
expansion.  
Thus, a winning strategy for a country is to seek to establish market access in the 
high-growth sectors, and in particular in the high-end segments of the high-growth 
products. The country should avoid getting stuck in the low-end segments of the market, 
or in shrinking sectors in world trade. The relevance of this observation to the issue of 
environmental standards is that these standards are generally used by Northern countries 
as a means of discriminating against low-end producers from the South, and thus 
providing a competitive advantage to high-end producers from the North. For Pakistan, 
while the policy process must seek to provide short-run protection to existing low-end 
producers, it would be extremely short-sighted to condemn them to survival in the low 
end of the market. A more far-reaching strategy is to use policy as well as negotiations to 
enhance the ability of its producers to enter into and compete in the high-end segments of 
the commodity chain. 
Take the case of the shrimp-turtle dispute. At one level, the issue is simplicity 
itself; the dispute is between low-cost shrimp fishers from Pakistan and their high-cost 
competitors from the US. At another level, however, it is a dispute between producers 
who can reliably communicate their product and process measures to consumers—
through certification, labeling, and disclosure—and those who lack the capacity for doing 
so. The former earn high economic rents because of this capacity; and their governments 
use the cover of environmental policy to further enhance the competitive advantage they 
accrue because of this capacity. The choice for Pakistan is either to concentrate on 
protecting the low-end market segment even if it knows that the earning potential of this 
segment will remain highly restricted; or to use every opportunity to enable these low-
end producers to break into the high-end market, in which the earning potential as well as 
growth impact are enormous.  
Breaking into the high-end segment is not easy; and nothing that is written here 
should give the impression that it is. It requires a concerted series of investments in such 
areas as certification, labeling, standardization, and disclosure—all areas in which 
Pakistan lags far behind other countries. More importantly, it requires an investment in 
the collective efficiency of producers by supporting producers’ associations as well as the 
development of common norms, codes of behavior, and standards of conduct.  
An alternative strategy, therefore, is to ensure that capacity building resources are 
made available from the global system for investment in the individual and collective 
capacities of low-end producers. The objective of such a strategy would be to enable low-
end producers to break into and begin competing with the high-end segments of the 
commodity chain.  
The demand for increased market access thus needs to be based on a proper 
understanding of the mechanisms by which this access would be most beneficial for the 
country. Pakistan’s shrimp and fishing industry is a case in point: at the rate at which 
fishing (both by coastline communities and by deep sea trawlers) is being promoted, there 
will very shortly be a severe shortage regardless of whatever environmental measures are 
imposed by MEAs or the WTO. Clearly, if shrimp stocks diminish, so will the future 
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trade potential of Pakistan. Similarly, if the waste being dumped into the Arabian Sea 
leads to the degradation of the coastal mangrove ecosystem (in fact at one of the highest 
depletion rates in the world), it will not only reduce forest produce but also degrade the 
habitat for shrimps that Pakistan exports.  
In other words, Pakistan has a choice. It can base its trade agenda exclusively on 
the maximum extraction of rapidly shrinking shrimp stocks (or natural resources in 
general); or orient it towards a forward-looking strategy in which the question is one of 
enhancing export revenues and growth stimulus from smaller volumes of shrimp 
exports—albeit with a much higher informational content. In fact, it is in the country’s 
long-term interest to reduce the natural resource content and enhance the information 
content of its production and exports. 
Pakistan can maintain its position on discrimination against developing countries 
generally, and can continue to demand capacity building (particularly through technology 
transfer) from the North (which has not delivered on prior promises). But it must develop 
alternative routes to capacity building and more globally compatible negotiating positions 
for the CTE to take to the Ministerial. Such positions must, again, be founded on the 
principles of sustainable development, and need to be focused on understanding more 
clearly what sorts of capacity building are needed to cope with emerging market access 
problems. 
 
3.2 ENVIORNMENT IMPACT AND MITIGATION COSTS OF CLOTH AND 
LEATHER EXPORTS FROM PAKISTAN 
 
Executive Summary 
Pakistan, like many other poor Southern countries, is currently double minded. On 
one hand, it finds that the rich countries are very slow in implementing the Uruguay 
Round trade agreements in liberalizing imports, particularly in sectors such as textiles 
and agriculture which are of interest to Pakistan. On the other hand, the world trade 
scenario is changing, independently of the sway of the WTO, as governments and 
businesses respond to consumer preferences for ecological friendly production and 
consumption and set to impose environmental standards. Thus, even the goods currently 
being exported are increasingly being expected to meet stringent environmental standards. 
Poor countries now feel that while it suited the North, they preached consumer 
sovereignty and confronted them with the “let the market decide” rhetoric. Now that 
several countries in the South have acquired comparative advantage in manufactured 
goods, the North is hiding behind environmental barriers to protect their industries, and 
forgetting the market ideology they preached. 
The issue is not quite as simple as it seems. If standards are responding to 
consumer preferences in the North, then the market ideology still prevails, and northern 
consumers in effect chose to consume goods that are produced by cleaner methods rather 
than those which are cheaper. However, Southern countries may need to be wary of 
protectionist use of environmental standards by rich country governments rather than 
those dictated by the market. In such cases, they should lobby via the WTO to ensure that 
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the old time market rule of “consumers’ sovereignty prevails”, particularly now that this 
benefits the poor countries. 
International justice notwithstanding, my research shows that there are good 
reasons for poor countries to want to meet the environmental standards being imposed by 
rich countries because the benefits of doing so for them exceed the costs. This argument 
is based on several premises. First, meeting environmental standards such as the ISO-
14000 can ensure efficiencies and economies within the firm. Second, these standards 
have built into them a process of quality controls and efficient management and these 
may go a long way to winning and retaining export markets. Third, meeting 
environmental standards also represents a win-win scenario on a macro-economic level, 
since a cleaner environment would lead to a reduction in health care costs, health-related 
productivity losses, health-related working days lost and health related livelihood losses. 
Fourth, from a social justice perspective, this saving gets more weight, since the poor are 
the most vulnerable to environmental depredations. Fifth, my research for cloth 
production and leather tanning shows that, contrary to the view held in the South that the 
costs of mitigating environmental damage are very high; in fact mitigation costs are quite 
modest at both the macro and micro level. 
 
The objective of this research was to estimate the increase in exports of cloth and 
leather and footwear, based on the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) and past trends, and identify the associated pollution and the benefits and costs of 
pollution mitigation. Textiles and leather are among two of the most polluting industries 
and, with in these industries, producing cloth and tanning leather are the most polluting 
processes. We selected the textile and leather industries because of their economic 
significance and their pollution impact. The textile industry ranks as number one in terms 
of exports, value added and employment. Leather ranks third in terms exports and, while 
it is not as significant in terms of value added or employment, it is the most polluting of 
all the industries. 
 
I have tried to estimate the export related environmental impact of cloth and 
leather. Following that, we assessed the mitigation impact of using cleaner technologies 
in terms of reducing the scale of pollution and then assessed the cost of mitigation. One 
way of building a strong case for mitigation is to demonstrate that these industries are 
highly damaging to the environment and human, plant and animal life. Ideally, one ought 
to precisely quantify the cost in rupee terms. A reduction of such cost thus becomes the 
benefit of mitigation that can the be compared to the monetary cost of mitigation. 
Unfortunately, sine cost quantification is indicated how this is likely to increase due to 
the export related increase in production.  
 
 The main finding of this research is that, at current emission rates, the pollution 
impacts of the exports of cloth and leather and footwear are very large. However, the 
mitigation cost at the macro level of reducing the pollution load by up to 91 percent for 
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cloth production and 66 percent for leather tanning are much smaller the commonly 
considered to be the case in the South.  
 
For textiles, BOD, COD and TSS are the main parameters for which current 
emissions are above local and international standards. The chemicals used in the textile 
industry are very toxic and corrosive and prolonged exposure poses a health risk.; The 
cotton dust is a health hazard since it can result in respiratory diseases. Other problems, 
resulting from the air emissions, include the pernicious odor and smog. The main 
problem results from the liquid effluents that are pumped untreated into drains that enter 
fresh water flows. This is not only a nuisance aesthetically, but also threatens aquatic life 
and only a nuisance aesthetically, but also threatens aquatic life and the use value of the 
water. Metals  and compounds like chromium and phenol are carcinogenic and dyes like 
azo are both carcinogenic and allergy inducing . These effluents also pose a threat to 
inland and coastal fisheries and seepage into the water table means an entry to toxic 
chemicals into the soil and food chain.  
 
For leather, the pollution load currently far exceeds national and international 
standards on all parameters. Leather is in this respect an even more hazardous industry. In 
addition to the problems of liquid effluents indicated for the textile industry, solid wastes 
contain chromium residues that can cause perforations and bronchial carcinoma from 
prolonged exposure. Poultry fed manufactures often buy wastes and this can result in the 
entry of chromium in the food chain. Tests have shown chromium residues in the poultry 
feed. The chromium and other metals in solid wastes also adversely affect plant growth. 
The hydrogen sulfide formed by the presence of sulfide in the effluent is highly toxic. 
Ammonia emissions cause irritation of the respiratory tracts. Other problems include 
headaches, stomachaches, dizziness, night blindness, leprosy, dermatitis and skin 
discorders. Leather dust can be carcinogenic and causes allergies, both of which represent 
a threat to the local population. 
 
Research shows serious problems of such contamination in Korangi and Charsada 
(Industrial Estates). Along the Karachi coast, tanneries contribute 10-15 percent of the 
total pollution. In the Punjab, prime agricultural land is being contaminated and the crop 
yield adversely affected. Using an ARIMA model, I forecasted exports of leather and 
footwear based on past trends, and I drew on a World Bank forecast for the increase in 
cloth exports due to the Uruguay Round ATC and combined this with an ARIMA 
forecast of cloth exports to non-quota countries. Between 1996-97 and the end of 2004 
cloth exports could be expected to rise by 45 percent and the corresponding increase in 
pollution load is calculated to be 81 percent. Leather exports are expected to decline so 
one can expect a 7 percent lower pollution load generated by leather tanning without 
mitigation measures. If mitigation measures are adopted, both in plant and external, up to 
91percent of the emissions from cloth and 66 percent of the emissions from tanning could 
be reduced. 
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The costs of such measures in 1996-97 at a macro level would have been Rs. 
2.598 billion for textile processing which amounts to 0.12 percent of GNP in 1996-97. 
The foreign exchange liability for this year would have amounted to Rs. 749.79 million 
or 1.6 percent of only cloth exports in 1996-97. More important, given government fiscal 
constraints, on a micro level the cost to industrialists for mitigation in a plant with a 21.45 
million square meters production capacity would have been a maximum of Rs. 10.42 
million or 1.6 percent of its sales revenue. For the leather industry, on a macro level the 
net mitigation cost (after subtracting the value of chromium recovery) in 1996-97 would 
have been 0.0048 percent of GNP and the mitigation cost to exporters of leather would 
have been 0.88 percent of their export revenue. These mitigation costs are even lower 
than for cloth reduction since clean production technology is locally available. In view of 
negative effects of pollution generated by these industries, as indicated in the preceding 
paragraphs, these mitigation costs seem modest indeed. This is contrary to a view 
expressed in the literature that the costs of establishing and operating clean technology 
are very high. 
 
Our stakeholder dialogues indicate that currently industry is inadequately 
informed of the rapid developments on the trade and environment interface. There is little 
awareness about standard setting that is currently underway in the OECD or about how 
competitors are positioning themselves. Often the market provides such information, but 
it can be when it is too late as happened in the case of Pakistani exports of surgical goods 
and shrimps. Since information is a public good that confers positive externalities, the 
Ministry of Commerce, Environment and the Export Promotion Bureau should be 
proactive and invest resources in the relevant information generation. The private sector 
would have an incentive to restrict information dissemination to recover private costs 
rather than encourage wide dissemination to maximize social gain. This is a classic case 
for state provision. 
 
A section dealing with trade and the environment in a larger WTO cell in the 
Ministry of Commerce, may work well. Such a cell could then work closely with the 
various Industry chambers and ensure Pakistan does not lose markets on account of non-
compliance with environmental standards and gains green niche markets. The response of 
the Textile Committee of the Government of India to the ban in OECD countries on azo 
dies is particularly instructive. 
 
The timing is very opportune for the government to work actively with industry 
and civil society to pursue an environmental and sustainable development agenda and at 
the same time reap the dividends of export promotion this will bring. The National 
Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS), which are part of the 1997 National 
Environmental Protection Act, are due for implementation next year. Industry has been 
involved in the process of standard setting, has agreed to paying a pollution change for 
pollution in excess of the NEQS via an enforceable process of self-monitoring (as in the 
case of taxation) and has even agreed to the amount of the charge. The Ministries of 
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Commerce, Industries and the Environment can strategically provide the necessary 
information as this process gets underway. 
 
As earlier pointed out, cleaner production in Pakistan may mean more exports, but 
it also represents an important step in the direction of sustainable development that can be 
viewed to be about justice for current and future generations. While the impact of poverty 
on the environment is often mentioned, less attention is paid to the poverty inducing 
aspects of environmental degradation via a loss in access to resources for livelihood and a 
loss in health, productivity, working days and jobs. 
 
4. Capacity Building – A Way Forward? 
Clause 33 “recognizes” the need for capacity building for developing countries to 
deal with the trade and environment agenda. However, the language in the clause is 
indecisive for two reasons: first, it does not commit the North to actually providing the 
requisite capacity building support; and second, it does not enter into the complicated 
debate about what actually constitutes capacity building. 
Nevertheless, about 30 WTO members pledged US$ 18 million to a new WTO 
technical assistance fund in March 2002, which is aimed at financing the bulk of the 
capacity building activities indicated in Doha. Members endorsed the technical assistance 
plan for 2002 in March, although developing countries insisted that the activities would 
be kept under constant review. About 500 activities, covering 22 issue areas (including 
trade and environment), are listed in the 2002 Coordinated WTO Technical Assistance 
Plan. The bulk of the activities are in the areas of services, implementation and Singapore 
issues. 
The key feature of the Plan, following from Clause 33 of the Doha Declaration, is 
an enhanced focus on inter-agency collaboration, including the involvement of the UN 
and regional development banks, but still a heavy reliance on meetings and briefings. The 
emphasis within trade and environment capacity building, however, remains largely 
restricted to seminars, meetings and workshops, involving the UNEP and some MEAs. 
This is unlikely to be of much lasting value to the South. 
The criticism leveled by a number of international agencies and most developing 
countries is that the Technical Assistance Plan for 2002 is an expression of the inability 
of the WTO Secretariat’s ability to build capacity in a meaningful way. The Plan does, 
indeed, rely too heavily on one-off seminars, which have proven to be too general and 
ineffective, and has little of substance to offer to developing countries seeking to build 
capacity for sustainable development. Such one-off events, including irregular “training” 
sessions for governmental officials, have proven ineffective in the Pakistani context in 
various dimensions, including trade and environment. A serious effort at understanding 
the outcome of such “capacity building” is yet to take place, although the lack of impact 
is generally visible. 
Many non-governmental organizations and trade delegates have instead called for 
the WTO to help build “policy capacity” within developing countries that can help to 
integrate international trade within larger development policies. However, such “broad-
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based” capacity building is not free of political implications. The following issues 
highlighted with regard to trade capacity building (Lecomte, 2001) are of particular 
relevance to Pakistan in trade and sustainable development: 
1. Risk of biased aid: It is important to recognize that the interest of the North as 
donors are fundamentally interlaced with its interests as trading partners with the 
South in trade capacity building. There is, thus, the risk (and evidence) of capacity 
building being provided to meet commercial interests over development interests. The 
broader “donor agenda” debate in Pakistan has pointed this out in other fields as well. 
What is needed, clearly, is a self-designed, holistic agenda to prevent any third party 
from harming that agenda, whether through aid or otherwise. The problem of defining 
an agenda for the South, and even for Pakistan alone, has proven to be a policy 
problem in the past, leaving open room for biases within capacity building to creep in. 
2. Donor coordination: The evidence from Pakistan clearly supports global experience 
that donor coordination for aid generally, and for trade capacity building particularly, 
has been missing. Donor capacity to build further capacity itself, interestingly, is one 
of the prime concerns of developing countries. 
3. Comprehensiveness: The absence of a holistic plan for integrating international trade 
into sustainable development policies is also evident. This stems partly from the lack 
of donor coordination, but mostly from the absence of such an agenda in developing 
countries, like Pakistan, themselves. As a result, there are enormous benefits in very 
limited, specific areas, but no overall progress. The ITC/WTO/UNCTAD Joint 
Integrated Technical Assistance Program for trade capacity building in Africa stands 
out among current initiatives as developing a holistic, process-oriented approach to 
counter the traditional project-oriented approach. Such initiatives, however, do not 
exist for Pakistan. The emerging aid and lending framework in Pakistan, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper being proposed by the World Bank and the Government of 
Pakistan, is not suitably tuned to either trade capacity building needs or to practical 
steps for sustainable development. 
4. Assessment: Most trade (and other) capacity building is oriented towards tangible 
results; hence the emphasis on projects and seminars, rather than processes. This 
supports, and is strengthened by, the typical procedures by which capacity building is 
assessed: quantitative and output-oriented. However, as has been argued above, the 
needs of developing countries, especially Pakistan, do not match this approach. There 
is a need to refine the assessment methodology for capacity building to emphasize 
process and policy-oriented capacity building. Again, such a direction needs to be 
provided by developing countries themselves. 
5. Legitimacy: Many donors are themselves struggling to reconcile trade and 
investment promotion programs with their own poverty alleviation initiatives. There 
is no doubt, then, that trade capacity building is faced with a problem of legitimacy 
when integrating with the overarching goals of sustainable development. Expecting 
enormous and immediate results in poverty alleviation from trade programs is, in any 
case, unrealistic. However, capacity building in trade and environment can contribute 
significantly to sustainable development goals if it is targeted at policy coherence. 
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Be that as it may, Clause 33 (combined with the weaker clause 51) offers an 
opening for Pakistan to help build its capacity for engaging with the WTO on trade and 
environment. However, the above section attempts to clarify the threats facing Pakistan 
as it uses this clause and the financial commitments made by the North. The principal 
factor in the debate is whether Pakistan can determine its own agenda, based on the goals 
of sustainable development, and use it to guide the coordination and orientation of 
capacity building initiatives. These lessons are evidenced by the history of capacity 
building in Pakistan, including the experience of the Green Revolution (Box 11), and the 
ETPI and TTSID programs (Box 12). The example of the Green Revolution, although 
believed to have been environmentally and socially harmful, provides valuable lessons 
for capacity building in trade and sustainable development. The experience of ETPI and 
TTSID is less heartening, arguably because the same level of coordinated effort never 
took place in either initiative as it did in the case of the Green Revolution. 
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Box 11 – Capacity Building in Pakistan: Lessons from the Green Revolution 
The Green Revolution in Agriculture, between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, led to a 
drastic increase in yields and productivities in several major crops including wheat, rice and cotton.  
However, it has arguably been harmful in environmental and social terms. Yet, the fact remains that 
technology that was in the hands of a few hundred scientists at most, was successfully transferred to 
millions of farmers, most of them illiterate, in the space of less than a decade. In this regard, it 
remains the leading example for capacity building in the country; it yields important lessons for 
capacity building, especially to tailor it to social and environmental goals. Green Revolution 
technology was based on the increase of agricultural yield through the introduction of high-yielding 
varieties of seed, chemical inputs and modern techniques. The technology relied on high-input 
farming, mechanization and excessive use of natural resources, principally water. Importantly, the 
technology required was generally not available in Pakistan, although Pakistan’s domestic policy soon 
integrated the needs in the planning process. 
The success of the technology is visible in its widespread adoption in small, medium and 
large farms throughout the country. The success was built on five inter-linked factors, mobilized 
roughly in unison to achieve the intended results: 
 Mobilization of economic incentives to the users (farmers): Ultimately, the Green 
Revolution was successful because the adoption of the new technology and practices was 
profitable for farmers. Indeed, the technology needed for adaptation to new techniques, inputs 
and knowledge create a short-term financial disincentive. This was overcome with massive 
subsidies, some by the providers of the technology (such as low-cost new seeds by seed 
corporations) and some by the government (such as subsidies to extract groundwater to fulfill the 
water-intensive requirements, or free or subsidized extension services). 
 Creation of a network of support institutions: These ranged from supply outlets in the 
remotest areas (such as seed corporations, both public and private), through technical assistance 
(through government extension and private experts) to financing institutions (such as the 
Agricultural Development Bank and agricultural loans through private banks). 
 Re-orientation of research: To ensure continuous adaptation of the technology to local 
conditions, government-led research centers were established or strengthened, and guided to 
undertake the requisite research and dissemination. 
 Mobilization of financial resources: Quite apart from the financial incentives offered to users 
to adapt, the Green Revolution managed to mobilize a large volume of credit through regional 
and international development banks. 
 Integration within domestic development policy and planning: Perhaps the single most 
important factor for the unprecedented and unparalleled achievement of the Green Revolution’s 
goals was the manner in which domestic policy was aligned to contribute to the goals. Financial, 
investment, social development, industrial and research policy were all aligned with agricultural 
goals to benefit from the Green Revolution. To date, this is the only such example in Pakistan’s 
domestic policy refining. 
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The experience of the Green Revolution, ETPI and TTSID yield valuable lessons 
for Pakistan to pro-actively define capacity building in its context: 
Long-term: a long-term vision is needed within which short-term, one-off or 
stand-alone events and projects may fit in. Without such a long-term view, the sum of a 
number of short-term events does not add up, but rather results in zero impact. Taking a 
long-term view necessitates a pro-active vision, and the definition of activities that can 
Box 12 – Capacity Building for Trade and Environment in Pakistan 
Environmental Technology Program for Industry (ETPI): an environmental initiative 
taken by Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) and the industrial 
sector, with funding from the Netherlands Government. The goal of ETPI was to help Pakistani 
industries in identifying and implementing the most economic and pollution controlling technologies. 
The program comprised six major components: Data Base Development, Institutional Networking, 
Dissemination and Communication, Institutional Support and Training, Demonstration Projects, and 
Monitoring and Evaluation. 
These components depict a comprehensive framework that facilitated the complex process of 
environmental change in industrial sector.  Phase 1 of ETPI included the most polluting industrial sub-
sectors identified by the NCS: Pulp and Paper; Cement; Sugar; Fertilizer; and Textile processing. The 
14 industrial based sectors covered in phase 2 were; Petrochemicals; Industrial Chemicals; Pesticides 
and Insecticides; Dies and Pigments; Pharmaceuticals; Food Processing; Edible Oils and Fats; Dairy; 
Tobacco; Steel; Automobile; Polyester-Fiber and Yarn; Wool and Wool Processing; and Textile 
Spinning and Weaving.  
Capacity building was initiated through the six components to integrate green technologies 
into the industrial sector. ETPI’s main achievements include: raising awareness among industry, 
brought industry to actively participate on environmental forefront, setting up of Environmental cells 
and Demonstration Projects. Key deficiencies include: lack of its own advertising of what it can do for 
others, little involvement of research institutions and universities, and especially little interaction with 
other international agencies involved in environmental projects. Although sufficient funds were 
mobilized, there was no overall policy coherence and no nation-wide mobilization of institutions. 
Technology Transfer for Sustainable Industrial Development (TTSID): The 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), with assistance from the Federal Office for Foreign 
Economic Affairs, Switzerland (FOFEA), initiated the program on market-based incentives for the 
environmental improvement in the industrial sector. The elements of TTSID included: establishment 
of innovative financial instruments, policy advice to government on environmental issues, 
development of an environmental monitoring program for the industry, environmental training 
services for the industrial sector, information and advisory services, and business-government round 
tables. TTSID provided support to industry and government for the promotion of policies and practices 
for sustainable industrial production through, business-government roundtables to facilitate regular 
consultations between the private sector and government on environmental issues. Supported by 
technical research, recommendations emerging from these consultations were used to provide advice 
to the government for the development and implementation of national environmental policy. Market 
based approach adopted by the program attracted industrialists to consider green technologies as cost 
reduction incentives. 
Through the information and advisory services component, the project produced information 
packages on environmental issues for selected technology suppliers, and a database for the exchange 
of information. Finally, the project also developed proposals for innovative financial mechanisms for 
the establishment of green credit facilities for environmental projects in industry. The training 
component of TTSID developed training materials by conducting environmental studies in selected 
industrial sub-sectors followed by hands-on training and workshops. This component also provided 
support to industry in building measures, and in identification of end-of-pipe treatment options. 
Importantly, TTSID houses a voluntary self-monitoring and reporting initiative for industrial pollution 
levels. Although the program has been successful in meeting most its outputs, the lack of policy 
coherence at the national level (albeit more than in the case of ETPI) has meant that impact is 
limited. 
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contribute to it. In addition, the long-term view brings into play the need for scale, which 
the Green Revolution managed to reach but ETPI and TTSID both could not. 
 
Policy integration: Stand-alone events and activities are useless to build capacity. 
They must fit in with a conducive policy. While the Green Revolution provides one 
positive example of this, negative examples abound, from the National Conservation 
Strategy to TTSID and the application of NEQS to the push for food security. 
Market-based incentives: Reliance on purely supply-side interventions has been 
a hallmark of capacity building in Pakistan, resulting in almost complete failure to sustain 
activities. The Green Revolution, on the other hand, created a financial incentive for end-
users (farmers) by making the technology (High-Yielding Variety seeds and chemical 
inputs) cheap through a diminishing series of subsidies. TTSID attempted to do the same 
with NEQS application but could not succeed. Few other initiatives can be pointed which 
have developed a market for capacity building measures in trade and sustainable 
development. 
Creation and mobilization of institutions, including research: With minor 
exceptions, there has been little creation of new institutions and mobilization of existing 
institutions towards a single policy goal. This has been, to a large extent, due to the 
absence of unifying vision, but where such a vision existed it has not been 
institutionalized. Research, in particular, has suffered. The research currently underway 
in most institutions is almost completely irrelevant to societal needs, particularly in the 
wake of emerging global trends. 
Mobilization of financial support on own terms: Once again, it is only a pro-
active vision that can determine the demands for financial support, either from within the 
country or from the North. In the absence of such a vision, the country has been largely 
reliant on donor grants according to donor agenda. This has resulted in different 
directions of capacity building, as donor coordination has typically been a major problem. 
Even in cases where there is a strong felt need by a number of stakeholders, there is little 
pro-active seeking of support. 
Flexible and process-related: It is being found that the “knowledge-based 
economy” requires adaptability of fast-changing global circumstances. As such, it is not 
the latest technology itself that is at a premium, but rather the ability to understand and 
develop such technology in advance. To ensure this, capacity building must focus not so 
much on the transfer of technology “hardware” but rather technology “software”, or the 
ability to develop and disseminate hardware. This perspective requires a paradigm shift 
from past capacity building efforts, particularly when combined with a need to develop 
process-related capacity, rather than substance-related capacity. The former requires the 
development of emerging skills, such as negotiations, conflict management, policy 
formulation, stakeholder convening, and so on, that can encourage widespread capacity 
building. 
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5. Recommendations: Headlights in the Haze 
 The above explanation of the Doha Declaration’s Clauses on Trade and 
Environment, within the context of the WTO-MEA relationship, leads to a complex 
picture. While what is needed is a sustained attempt by Pakistan to develop macro-policy 
coherence over time, some direction can immediately be provided in light of the above.  
Two fundamentally distinct types of recommendations are worth describing: 
process-oriented and substantive. Both sets of recommendations arise from one 
overriding principle, that neither enhanced international trade not environmental 
conservation are goals by themselves – Pakistan’s overriding concern is sustainable 
development, and all policies and actions need to support that goal. 
 
5.1 Sustainable Development: The Center of Gravity 
The fundamental issue is that Pakistan’s ultimate policy goal needs to be defined 
with greater clarity, keeping in view the challenges as well as the opportunities provided 
by the global system. We have argued in some detail that engagement in the trade 
discussions on the basis of a single dimension, namely market access, is neither desirable 
nor valuable. Pakistan needs to assess the potential for economic growth and sustained 
development, both in terms of the most fruitful opportunities for producers, and the most 
promising stance for building coalitions and attracting support as well as investment. 
The principle issue that emerges from an understanding of the Doha Declaration, 
MEA and WTO linkages and other developmental efforts of Pakistan is the need to 
develop an indigenous agenda around which to orient all other policies and actions. First, 
building upon the existing policy stance, this agenda must include economic growth, but 
it has to be based on a renewed understanding of the basis of economic growth in a 
knowledge-based economy. Second, given the predominance of poverty in Pakistan, it 
has to give centrality to poverty eradication and the protection of the vulnerable. Third, 
given the ethical nature of commitments given at the global level, and also the rapidly 
expanding degree of environmental degradation in the country, it has to include the 
environment.  
The broad approach of sustainable development is particularly well suited to 
bridge trade and environment concerns, as well as to build a policy community7 to 
achieve the goals. 
 
 
 
                                          
7 A policy community is defined by Banuri and Khan (2000) as a network of individuals and institutions with interest 
and expertise, and therefore a stake in the process of decision-making, in a particular area. It is based on the idea that 
policy-making is not a monolithic exercise located in one ministry or agency, but involves cooperation between distinct 
government agencies, as well as with non-governmental entities: NGOs, media, business, academia, etc. The decision-
making process invariably reflects the relative political influence of these groups and involves political negotiations 
and compromises between them. 
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Operationally, this has three dimensions: 
 
1. A process needs to be initiated to develop a consistent, comprehensive and 
indigenous sustainable development policy framework. The National Conservation 
attempted to provide exactly this, but did not succeed (Hanson et al, 2000). The next 
generation of an NCS is being planned, but it is unclear how that would evolve, 
whether it would be as broad as is being contemplated here, and whether it would 
have the centrality required (such as is being accorded to the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper). The biggest success of the NCS, however, does offer a useful lesson 
in developing a participatory, inclusive and continuously evolving process for 
national policy formulation. However, what the NCS did not do adequately is to 
integrate the perspective of globalization, particularly from the point of view of 
international trade and environment. Furthermore, a new policy process must also be 
well integrated with all policy dimensions, including finance, domestic and foreign 
security, international relations and social development. 
2. As it evolves, such an integrated policy framework can guide the development of 
institutional and legislative mechanisms to support it. This, again in contrast to the 
past, must incorporate realistic responsibilities for multilateral commitments and 
should aim at involving different sets of stakeholders at multiple levels. Of key 
importance is the temporal order of this sequence: first a policy framework, then 
legislation and then support institutions. 
3. If freer and fairer trade is to lead to real benefits, particularly with regard to 
sustainable development indicators, a sustainable development policy framework 
must be focused on creating the conditions conducive to such an impact. This means 
that the framework must tie in, and to an extent guide, developments in governance, 
human resource, productive infrastructure and the generation of knowledge. 
International trade is of particular relevance to such a framework, as it provides a 
necessary window onto the process of globalization, which needs to be understood 
more thoroughly. However, by integrating within itself the perspective of 
globalization, such a framework is naturally suited to be a central point for other 
policy areas. 
 
The experience of many countries is that the formulation of such macro policy 
frameworks is a capacity development process in itself. More importantly, it provides a 
nation with an agenda on which to negotiate in the era of shifting alliances within global 
politics. The purpose of making this recommendation here is to emphasize the 
importance of a guiding principle for Pakistan as it engages in the trade and sustainable 
development debate, as well as to lay the seeds for the initiation of such a massive 
undertaking. 
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5.2 Pakistan’s Position on WTO-MEA Linkages 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, Pakistan’s consistent position to 
prevent any progress in the trade and environmental arena is simply not feasible any more. 
Holding to the position is likely to lead to a loss of credibility in other negotiations and to 
missing out on possible capacity building while there is time. 
While some of these tensions between WTO and MEAs open up possibilities for 
leverage in negotiations, the prime issue is that Pakistan needs to gear up to meet 
requirements in either regime. At the global level, Pakistan needs to ensure that the 
unification of both regimes leads to outcomes that are conducive to sustainable 
development. This is already the position of many developing countries and a support 
network of international organizations (both governmental and non-governmental). The 
way to ensure that is through: 
• Word games: lobbying for language in all WTO texts, Committee decisions and 
MEA Conferences of Parties that is actively in support of SD; 
• Coalition building: leading a Southern process to define sustainable development 
from a Southern perspective, and make that the basis for Southern negotiations at the 
WTO. The Development Box proposal, led (among others) by Pakistan, Kenya and 
the Dominican Republic and the Food Security Box proposal advocated by India are 
examples of such processes, although neither met with much success in Doha; 
• Information flows: There is a general sentiment in all quarters that the lack of 
regular information exchange between MEAs and WTO secretariats and the WTO 
Dispute Resolution mechanism is a leading gap. Both formal and informal 
information exchange is being widely advocated, and the Committee on Trade and 
Environment has recognized this as a key concern, and the meeting of the CTE on 
June 11 – 14, 2002 is expected to include an information session with some MEA 
Secretariats. Pakistan itself can support such information exchanges, and develop 
domestic mechanisms for the same. 
It is unclear whether Pakistan should take definitive positions on the finer points 
of institutional harmonization at just this stage prior to negotiations. The question of 
whether environment-trade disputes will be held in the WTO Dispute Resolution 
mechanism or through the more diffuse MEA mechanisms is certainly relevant to the 
broader debate. However, without a broad sustainable development framework at the 
center of Pakistani policy, and without any significant assessment of international trade 
trends and WTO on Pakistan, taking a position on such issues would be premature. What 
can be done forthwith is for Pakistan to take a position that any issue arising in MEA-
WTO linkages will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, keeping sustainable 
development imperatives at the forefront. This will immediately remove the negative 
impact of blanket positions. 
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5.3 Recommendations for Future Trade Policy of Pakistan  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the positions that Pakistan could take 
internationally need to be supported by strategies at the national and provincial levels in 
order to ensure that sustainable development objectives are met, through binding trade 
and environment issues. 
 
An internal Pakistani position 
The following points summarize the elements that Pakistan could include in a 
sustainable development framework to ensure that trade and environment issues are 
addressed: 
 
 Following the turtle excluder device case that Pakistan and other Pacific Rim 
countries won against the U.S. and their environmental lobby; almost all of the 
fishermen within the shrimp industry are installing turtle excluder devices in their 
catch nets. This interesting contradiction necessitates an examination of the 
possible elements of such a precedent and its real outcome. This makes the impact 
that case law has on real market behavior questionable. 
 What institutional elements are required to facilitate our industries installation of 
environmentally sound technology? Are we simply Research in the areas of 
increasing exports of leather and textiles produced data that suggested that costs 
are extremely low in implementing mitigation measures. Real cost data must be 
generated at the sector level to communicate whether or not mitigation cots are 
absorbable or not. Mitigation costs are absorbable or not. 
 Only in the non-availability of incentives for environmentally friendly behavior 
should government, embark on command and control type of mechanisms. 
Market based instruments have been proven to work better in contemporary 
regulatory frameworks as compared to the more adversarial, state structures of the 
past. Incentives need to be instituted locally and for imports to drive industry 
towards sustainable technology and address the higher increases in dirty industries 
in developing countries as compared to those in developed countries. The creation 
of a segregated tariff structure that favors environmentally friendly imports and 
technologies could curb the growing number of dirty technologies and industries 
within Pakistan. Such an offsetting factor would be useful as a lot of inefficiency, 
generated by a highly protective trade regime, has increased the use of dirty 
technologies in industrial and energy production in Pakistan. Furthermore, high 
duties in the past have resulted in old vehicles being retained with adverse 
impacts on pollution. 
 Research, advocacy and networking within the sphere of environmental research 
and technology needs to take place to identify whether we are capable of 
protecting our environment with local means, as per the commitments and goals 
outlined in the NCS, or whether we really need technical assistance. A hybrid 
research and networking institute could serve as a hub for industrialists (expert 
market concerns), resource experts (all sectors), NGOs (collaborative research, 
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long term monitoring) and government representatives (Ministry of Commerce, 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry Economics, Ministry of Agriculture) to 
collaborate, generate and assess options that utilize best available environmental 
technologies in responding to trade and environment issues close to the ground. 
This inter governmental agency/body could also monitor the database 
recommended by the CTE and inform and disseminate information to policy 
makers and affected industries before grace periods expire and market access is 
threatened. 
 Implement layers of local laws and policies that will protect Pakistan’s farmers, 
indigenous trades (especially the vulnerable and informal SMEs) and the 
environment from bio piracy and unsustainable development of the agricultural 
sector by MNCs and TNCs. 
 Encourage industrial participation and awareness as a whole, especially with 
respect to export led growth. Identify firms in sectors that are large enough to 
register their internal management systems to the ISO 14,000 standards and 
congruently, identify growth constraints that when removed, will allow for 
increased revenue to offset registration cots. Insist on financial and technical 
assistance to develop our own internationally recognized body for certification.  
 
An External position 
 
The following positions need to be articulated by Pakistan and like-minded 
nations at the next WTO ministerial. 
 
 There is, naturally, a need to monitor and manage these issues on a global scale, 
independent of a trade related forum. This lends credibility to be suggestion made 
by David Runnals, the President of the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, that a World Environment Association be set up to create and 
manage Multi Lateral Environmental Agreements and take ownership of linkages. 
 As transpired in an NGO organized session at UNCTAD X, there is much 
disagreement between NGOs of the North and south on the issue of linking trade 
and environment as well as labour standards to the WTO. Thee is consensus 
however, that such issues need to be left to expert organizations that have been 
working on them for some time, namely the ILO, UNEP/UNCTAD and others. 
 Pakistan’s sovereign organizations (Government organizations, Inter Government 
Organizations NGOs), that are active in international networks, need to engage 
their counterparts in the North and make them aware of southern positions and 
effects that linkages will have closer to the ground. Ideally, cooperation and 
collaboration between Northern and Southern NGOs could result in alternative 
mechanism that could promote sustainable development without hindering 
Southern development. Pakistan should engage developing nations with similar 
interests in discussions to formulate specific proposals and positions to advance 
their objectives. Such a tactic should be pursued modeled in South Asia through 
the sharing of resources and encouragement of dialogue between different 
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partners both in the public and NGO sectors. This will ensure more coordinated 
and better thought out positions during negotiations. A tactic that might result 
from such unity may be to encourage a system of ‘proxy votes’ so that countries 
may transfer their voting power to likeminded countries. This will ensure 
inclusion of poorer, resource strapped nations in negotiations where if they cannot 
be present, their vote will at least count. 
 At the holistic level, Pakistan should support politics that will reduce the WTO to 
the level of another global institution (without broad sweeping powers) and make 
it accountable to its member countries. Any WTO trade and environment related 
action should be used as a last resort (although we would not want it used at all) 
and must be supported by adequate MEA based research (UNEP/UNCTAD 
sponsored). 
 Pakistan should lobby for clauses and rules that will ensure that any future trade 
and environment related work of the CTE will involve participation from all 
countries with effective participation coming from nations belonging to different 
geographical biomes and regions at different stages of economic and social 
development. 
 The CTE must arrive at a clear and distinct separation of what constitutes a 
multilateral action in the framework of an MEA and from unilateral or plurilateral 
action. Paragraph 174 as a whole needs to be clarified and monitored, to assure 
that the relationship between WTO provisions, the Multilateral Trading System 
(MTS) and the MEAs are not in conflict and do not serve as protectionist barriers. 
The necessity for tests to monitor the impact of environment measures on trade 
needs to be given to UNCTAD/UNEP like forums (follow the example in 
paragraph 176). Furthermore, such information should lead to the use of a 
principle of subsidiarity whereby the lowest jurisdictional level of action 
consistent with effectiveness should be given authority.   
 The precautionary principle within the WTO context requires some work. 
Specific concerns that Pakistan should express include the following: 
o When do WTO rules have an impact on domestic regulation? We need a 
proper balance between trade and precautionary disciplines. To what 
extent are dispute panels in the future going to be prepared to look inside 
the national regulatory process? The best approach should lie with the 
‘deference principle’, i.e. In the idea that the WTO should accord 
deference to the policy choices of its members and especially take into 
account the capabilities of the developing nations. 
o The link between the rules of the multilateral trading system and general 
principles of international law needs to be examined. In this instance, the 
issue is to what extent the WTO rules and dispute settlement should take 
the precautionary principle into account on the basis that it has become a 
general principle of international law. 
o Mandatory eco labeling, PPM based restrictions and other exclusionary 
devices should not be imposed on resource strapped Southern economies 
as this would hinder the developing efforts of firms and of course, stall the 
efforts at recovery by sick firms. Life Cycle Assessment expertise does not 
lie within the CTE’s mandate. Eco-labeling, while being linked to 
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consumer awareness, may have trade effects that should be monitored. 
Where is eco-labeling beneficial? What is its market potential and what 
are the potential trade effects? 
 A multilateral fund should be created on the lines under the Montreal Protocol for 
helping developing and least developed countries to acquire clean, 
environmentally sound (patented) technologies and practices (in accordance with 
Agenda 21 provisions). 
 Oppose any attempt to amend Article XX of the GATT to incorporate a specific 
“environment window” for taking unilateral trade measures to protect domestic 
environment, which may act as “disguised protectionism”. This has particular 
implications for exports in textiles. 
 The issue of Bio Piracy needs to be addressed to protect indigenous farmers and 
traditional knowledge from MNCs that wish to patent such knowledge, both in the 
local market and internationally. 
 There should be attempts to make the notification procedures for setting 
international standards for goods and services more transparent so that developing 
and least developed countries’ exports are compatible with international standards, 
and compliance processes can be made easier. 
 Developing countries should provide zero tariff access to all products produced 
by LDCs. It should also be complemented by technical assistance, whose funds 
could assist in: 
o Linking trade promotion activities to the environment 
o Providing training for environmental impact assessment 
o Cooperation among producers to attain economies of scale and access to 
technology 
o Increasing consumer awareness, tied to specific industry efforts on 
sustainable industrial development. 
 Developed countries have not been taking seriously their commitments made 
under the heading of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) at the time of 
signing the Marrakesh Declaration. A stock taking exercise needs to be taken 
during the third ministerial conference. In addition, a clause/understanding needs 
to be included so that no ‘strings or future concessions’ are attached to SDT, a 
stand-alone issue/s, as is being implied in the statements made in Seattle. The link 
between market access, environmental degradation and poverty needs to be 
emphasized in making a stronger case for increased market access to generate 
funds for environmental protection. 
 Trade and environment is a sophisticated issue whose impacts and distortions will 
differ from country to country and region to region. In order to address 
environmental issues without incurring adverse effects on trade, policies need to 
be premised on individual study and work at the local level by export 
organizations (UNCTAD/UNEP). Such a forum should also be empowered with a 
dispute settlement mechanism to remedy concerns. 
 Pursuing a ‘ phased negotiation’ strategy (Najam, 1999) will allow the South,  
especially with respect to trade and environment issues, to monitor 
implementation of agreements with expertise, close to the ground, and identify 
such negative impacts before their effects become service. In order for such a shift 
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in mentality, the North needs to drop the traditional sanctions based theory of 
inducing change. 
 Developed countries should exercise voluntary restraint on dumping of 
domestically prohibited goods and toxic substances in the developing countries 
and LDCs. They should not shift or relocate their dirty industries in to developing 
and least developed countries, taking advantage of the pollution haven. 
  There needs to be more emphasis placed on the superior degree of sustainability 
that is achieved with traditional, labour intensive, indigenous business; rather than 
with modernized, capital intensive industry. Environmental economics and 
ecological ‘foot printing’ has proven time and time again that the more labor 
intensive and seemingly more polluting industries of the south are relatively more 
sustainable on a total cost scale than the high technology, capital intensive and 
‘green marketed’ industries of the North. Capital intensive ventures, through their 
sophisticated and increased use of technology use of technology use more raw 
materials, manufacturing process and is much more environmentally harmful than 
labor powered ventures within the developing world as the costs of raw material, 
manufacturing process, energy supply and depreciation generated by machinery 
and technology incur significant and yet hidden cots to the environment. 
Furthermore, such ventures displace labor driven production (as cost distortions 
do not take into account full environmental costs). For example, green economists 
had discussed repeatedly, that if the world’s fishing fleets were modeled after 
those in Japan; and if the world’s agriculturalist were to follow the capital-
intensive farming taking place in Ohio or Nebraska; resource depletion would 
accelerate by many fold. If developing countries can successfully articulate this, 
then the marketing implications, labeling benefits and market access on a global 
scale will have a significantly positive impact on sustainable development for 
both the developing world and the developed world. This will build a case for 
organizing clusters of SMEs and making their export packages more attractive 
while reducing their mitigation costs. One aspect that is continuously missed from 
any debate on PPMs and Lifecycle assessment (LCAs), is the total environmental 
costs of comparing Northern vs. Southern industries. Essentially, a sector oriented, 
case by case approach needs to be taken on each issue, without raising barriers or 
restricting the development of Southern markets. 
 Push for the elevation of the research and capacity building focused 
UNEP/UNCTAD joint project to a policy influencing capacity and emphasized 
the need to have indigenous and traditional farming (with small ecological 
footprints) given special treatment and ‘credits’ for having little impact. Such 
mechanisms need to be employed in order to encourage SMEs to stay simple and 
sustainable, rather than unnecessarily make capitalization and a shift towards high 
tech seem profitable. Also, placing more authority within a UNEP/UNCTAD 
research vehicle will  encourage a country by country approach to environment 
and trade; giving developing nations with a little more leverage. 
 Developed countries should make arrangement to transfer environmentally sound 
technologies to the developing countries and LDCs, and go beyond rhetoric. 
Developed countries should offer technical assistance to the developing countries 
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and LDCs to help them building the capacity of their officials as well as 
entrepreneurs to deal with the issues of trade and environment more effectively. 
 ** The heart of the issue is that how to socialize a competitive economy which 
pitches company against company and workers against workers and country 
against country. A regional approach to solving this problem and balancing the 
good with the bad of a socialized free market economy may be extended to the 
global level**. 
 
Conclusion 
Pakistan should support and promote the suggestion made by David Runnals of 
IISD to create a World Environment Association (perhaps in collaboration with the 
special project recently launched at UNCTAD X between UNCTAD and UNEP) that will 
manage, oversee and serve as a forum for multilateral environmental agreements. 
 
Traditional command and control type of, sanctions based instruments may work 
in developed markets for industries that have the capacity to embrace and adopt 
environmentally sound technologies, but not in developing countries. The lack of 
resources in poorer economies needs to be taken into consideration during WTO 
negotiations to ensure that any more barriers or hindrances to the development of 
Southern market capacities and capabilities are not erected through trade and 
environment policies. 
 
There is a need to bring the NCS into line with trade and environment related 
standards that will continue to be pushed on developing nations in exchange for market 
access. In order to clarify and activate the strategy, the environmental potential of 
government, industry and civil society need to be addressed, jointly and co-operatively. 
 
Eco labeling has taken up so much time on the agenda that other issues that 
needed to come into play (standards, and technical regulations, packaging, labeling and 
recycling among others) have been ignored. 
 
Pakistan, along with other Southern negotiators, must focus on how to: 
 
 Embody the linkages between trade, environment, development, poverty and 
environmental degradation. 
 Replace the correlation between environmental protection and liberalization. 
 Design mechanisms that will: 
o Ensure environmental benefits, 
o Complement trade liberalization with safeguard market access, 
o Encourage import of environmentally sound technologies, finance and 
capacity building, 
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o Exclude and reject disguised protectionism while emphasizing better 
living standards, social awareness and environmental technology. 
 
In achieving such broad goals, Southern negotiators can draw strength from the 
positive data that has been accumulated thus far from UNEP country based studies on 
integrating sustainable development objectives into developing economies: 
 
 Full resource valuation, full cost pricing of resources, and the use of market based 
instruments needs to be maintained and expanded along with a mix of 
standardizing. 
 Economic valuation, and full cost pricing of natural resources has proven to be 
successful in a number of cases. Each country situation is different and designs of 
instrumentation need to also be made different. 
 Awareness among decision makers, country ownership with wide stakeholder 
participation, endogenous problem identification and policy formulation, 
strengthened in country expertise and capacity, and integration and ‘learning by 
doing’ are essential for successful sustainable development integration. 
 
The debate up until now within the CTE has demonstrated the built in inequities 
and the inherent imbalances in dealing with environmental issues. There is a need to 
ensure that the Southern environmental agenda is brought into the discourse. This 
position should place the trade and environment discourse within the broader framework 
of sustainable livelihoods, poverty alleviation, social and environmental justice, and the 
expansion of ecological and human security. The onus for such a position in Pakistan lies 
with Government, scholars and policy oriented NGOs. 
 
 
The Future is a Winding Road… 
The Doha Declaration, and in particular Articles 31 through 33, mark a significant 
turn around a global corner: environment can no longer be separated from the 
international trade agenda. Future negotiations will focus on exactly this issue, 
representing both threats and opportunities for the South. 
While it is unclear where exactly this turn will lead to, particularly when 
combined with non-WTO trends – such as consumer pressure – it is clear that Southern 
countries including Pakistan need to start defining their agenda pro-actively. Sustainable 
development can provide the foundation for such a pro-active agenda, based on which 
new negotiating positions can be evolved internationally and new policy steps taken 
domestically. 
In view of the broad-based nature of this study, it is quite likely that the next step 
needs to be a translation of this prescription into policy. However, the research study has 
gone to some length to point out the futility of one-off prescriptions or events; instead 
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what is called for is a process approach to building flexible capacity to engage in the 
brave new world. 
Three future-oriented actions may be stressed: 
1. Immediately initiate a long-term, dynamic process of research, focusing on the 
impact assessment of trade liberalization and WTO requirements in the three 
dimensions outlined earlier. 
2. Initiate a process involving civil society and the private sector, possibly through 
the WTO Cell Working Group mechanism, on defining negotiating positions. 
3. Facilitate a long-term research process for unpacking “sustainable development” 
in the context of international trade for Pakistan, resulting in clear policy actions. 
 
These steps are expected to enable Pakistan to deal with the knowledge-divide 
that is both a threat and an opportunity to its economy. In a one-way street, Pakistan 
can choose to make itself more competitive or stand aside. The choice, as always, is 
ours… 
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